Japan’s victory in the 1905 Russo-Japanese War prompted the cultivation of transnational ties between both Japan and the world of Islam and continued in earnest until the end of World War II. This relationship coincided with a period of significant human migration –propelled by events such as the Young Turk Revolution in 1908, the Russian Revolution of 1917 that gave rise to the Soviet Union, and the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 to name but a few –that would come to influence many aspects of life in the Asian continent. Individual actors who were a part of this diasporic movement, such as Russian refugees and Indian merchants, would come to influence Japanese policies, including those regarding religion.
“Individual actors who were a part of this diasporic movement, such as Russian refugees and Indian merchants, would come to influence Japanese policies, including those regarding religion.”
An examination of Japan’s Islam policy, or kaikyō seisaku, makes it evident that many Muslim émigrés, within and outside of Japan, played an active role in the development of this policy, especially within China. Although Japan’s Islam policy was not limited to China, the strategy of courting Chinese Muslims was the most extensive and long-running in comparison to its Islam policy in other parts of Asia. Each of these communities contributed to Japan’s evolving relationship with Islam in different ways. In what follows, I examine the life trajectories of some of these individuals and their role in Japan’s Islam policy.
Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic Figures Come Together
For many years during the early twentieth century, waves of refugees fled wherever they could go. Because of Japan’s success against the Russians in 1905, many Russian Muslims looking to escape turned to Japan. Some settled in Japan; however, many others ended up settling in Manchuria, especially in Harbin and Mukden. The émigré population in Manchuria as well as in Northwest China and Inner Asia gave Japan a strategic advantage as the Japanese government looked to these Muslim communities to help secure Japan’s newly acquired territory from the Soviets and Chinese, especially during the 1920s and 1930s. A former Japanese intelligence officer who had been stationed in Harbin retrospectively explained that the army was interested in the communal solidarity of Muslims (Japan, Turkey, and the World of Islam, 29).
“A former Japanese intelligence officer who had been stationed in Harbin retrospectively explained that the army was interested in the communal solidarity of Muslims.”The army leadership desired to use this solidarity to their advantage, especially in Manchuria, since it had become a refuge to many Russian émigrés who faced persecution for their faith. This relationship was beneficial to both the Japanese and to the Russian émigrés, including Abdurresid Ibrahim (1857-1944) and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali (1892-1972), who sought to make Japan their champion against Western imperialism.
Abdurresid Ibrahim and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali
“…Abdurresid, members of the Kokuryūkai, and other Japanese sympathetic to the Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic cause with a desire for further Japanese expansion, as well as three Chinese Muslims, all signed a scroll which would later come to be known as the Muslim Oath, pledging Japanese commitment to a “Pan-Asianist vision of Japan’s global claim to Asia through Islamic activism.”In 1909, Abdurresid Ibrahim, a leading pan-Islamist and political activist who was born in the Russian Empire, made a trip to Japan to learn about the Japanese and to promote an idea of self-defense centering on “the union of Asian countries [standing] up to Europe.” His primary aim was to liberate Russian Muslims who, like himself, were forced to flee their country. During this time, he forged close ties with the Kokuryūkai –also known as the Black Dragon Society or Amur River Society –which consisted of prominent right-wing members of the government and military whose own goal of creating a unified Asia under the leadership of Japan aligned with the ideas of Abdurresid (Japan, Turkey, and the World of Islam, 5-18). In the same year, Abdurresid, members of the Kokuryūkai, and other Japanese sympathetic to the Pan-Asian and Pan-Islamic cause with a desire for further Japanese expansion, as well as three Chinese Muslims, all signed a scroll which would later come to be known as the Muslim Oath, pledging Japanese commitment to a “Pan-Asianist vision of Japan’s global claim to Asia through Islamic activism” (Japan, Turkey, and the World of Islam, 8, 66). This oath became well-known, but some, including two Chinese authors, Ching-chih Yang and Lu Zhenyu,[1] saw the oath as insincere and claimed it was an attempt by the Japanese to, as they both wrote, “enslave” the Chinese. Be that as it may, many like Abdurresid thought of the oath as being pivotal to the relationship between the Japanese and the Islamic world and did what they could to promote it.
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali, a Bashkir militia commander who fought against the Bolsheviks and then helped to lead his community to safety in Manchuria, was another proponent of Japan and its relationship with Muslims in Asia. He was crucial in bolstering the support of Muslims for Japan within Manchuria and Northwest China, including in Gansu province (Japan, Turkey, and the World of Islam, 13). Qurban ‘Ali later became a pillar of the Muslim community in Tokyo. Due to Qurban ‘Ali’s efforts to strengthen Muslim support for the Japanese, the Japanese government and the zaibatsu, or Japanese business conglomerates, gave financial support to Qurban ‘Ali, which he used to help the Muslim community in Tokyo and for the later construction of the Tokyo Mosque (completed in 1938). This was not the only case in which the Japanese would provide funding in return for the support of Muslims.
“The Japanese reliance on Muslim solidarity as an overarching tie that could bind differing communities together did not take into consideration the unique and complex circumstances that fragmented Muslim communities within China and Japan.”
Business Ties
The relationship between Muslim Indians and Japanese businessmen proved mutually beneficial in the 1930s. This relationship began when Indian merchants took over Chinese businesses after the Chinese began boycotting Japanese goods in 1928 and again from 1931 to 1932 (after the Manchurian Incident). A large Muslim Indian merchant population formed in Japan, primarily in Kobe, but also in Osaka and Yokohama. Since many of these Indian entrepreneurs-primarily coming from Bombay, Sind, and Punjab-were Muslim, they looked to Japanese industrialists for financial support to build the Kobe Mosque (completed in 1935). The Indian community in Japan focused more so on their own local issues, rather than Japan’s pan-Asian activities abroad that were being advocated for by the Russian émigrés residing in Tokyo, such as Abdurresid Ibrahim and Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali.
“The Indian community in Japan focused more so on their own local issues, rather than Japan’s pan-Asian activities abroad…”
Ching-chih Yang and Lu Zhenyu[2] explain that one of the main ways the Japanese tried to gain the support of Muslims within China was through monetary aid. To encourage young Muslims to join the Japanese-established Islam League of Manchuria, and other such pro-Japanese Muslim organizations, the Japanese offered incentives, which ranged from employment opportunities to scholarships for study-abroad programs. Additionally, pro-Japanese organizations, and even some schools, were given generous monthly subsidies. The impetus behind this largesse was to create a sense of indebtedness that would have to be returned, such as in leading anti-Communist demonstrations, spying, or other such clandestine activities necessary to the Japanese army’s strategic interests. It should be noted, however, that giving financial assistance was not the only means through which the Japanese tried to earn the support of Muslim communities within China.
Laojiao, the Japanese, and the Hui Muslims
The Japanese also aimed to establish and communicate a religious affinity with Islam. This process was an attempt to influence Chinese Muslims into drawing closer to the Japanese while also undermining the collective impression of a unified Chinese people. The Japanese instead emphasized differences between Muslims and non-Muslims in China. Through this strategy, the Japanese attempted to use Islam as a means of creating a shared identity that would break down Muslims’ Chinese identity and that would rebuild their identity as Japanese. On the other hand, the Chinese Nationalist government, or the Kuomintang, countered Japanese efforts by developing their own state ideology based on an idea of nationalism –rather than basing it on religion or ethnicity that would only participate in a process of “othering” –that cultivated a sense of inclusion by employing the Hui concept of laojiao.
When Islam first made its way to China, the principle of “unity being,” which means that everything is of Allah, was also introduced. To reconcile this notion with the guiding principle of Confucianism, the Mandate of Heaven, Hui Muslims had to develop the concept of laojiao. Laojiao was the Hui people’s coexisting belief in both principles, thus fusing the philosophies of Islam and Confucianism. Laojiao is unique to Chinese Muslims or Hui who speak the majority language of Hanyu. This idea, however, was rejected by Uighur Muslims, who speak a Turkic language and are primarily from Xinjiang. But as Matsumoto Masumi, historian of modern Chinese history, explains, it became possible for the Hui, who believed in laojiao and the underlying “unity being,” to understand and embrace the then-nascent ideas of a national identity and patriotism.
“Laojiao was the Hui people’s coexisting belief in both principles, thus fusing the philosophies of Islam and Confucianism.”In conjunction with the government’s efforts, local Hui elites helped cultivate the notion of a unified national identity by suggesting that unity could also contain diversity, whether religious or ethnic. With the shift created by Han politicians and Hui intellectuals, stereotypes about the Muslims being fierce and brutal, which had previously been used to discriminate against them, were reframed as desirable in the effort to stop the Japanese. Thus, throughout the 1930s, most Hui supported the patriotic and nationalistic ideology of the Kuomintang.
Thoughts for Further Exploration
The Japanese reliance on Muslim solidarity as an overarching tie that could bind differing communities together did not take into consideration the unique and complex circumstances that fragmented Muslim communities within China and Japan.
“The Japanese reliance on Muslim solidarity as an overarching tie that could bind differing communities together did not take into consideration the unique and complex circumstances that fragmented Muslim communities within China and Japan.”Hui, Uighur, Russian Muslim refugees, and Indian merchants each had their own identity and opinions regarding Japan’s pan-Asian rhetoric. Russian émigrés persecuted for their faith sought refuge in their belief that Japan would be the protector of Islam from the oppression of Western imperialism. Each community had their own reasons for either supporting or not supporting the Japanese. One aspect comprising their decisions was their own perceptions –and, to a degree, international perceptions –of Japan’s intent behind its alignment with Islam.
In the U.S. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan, in the 1932-1939[3] and 1940-1944[4] collections, the reports on several occasions contain underlying questions regarding the Japanese and their relationship to Islam. A few records detail the conversion of Japanese diplomats who publicly professed a faith in Islam, along with speculative conclusions being made about the individual’s conversion, either suggesting that the conversion reflected sincere belief or insisting that a conversion was instead politically and strategically motivated. These reports highlight an important dimension that has been relatively untouched by modern historians of this topic: religious belief itself.
“Relying on [ empirical evidence alone], however, tends to omit or underrepresent ideological, spiritual, and emotional experiences that could have been significant forces in shaping Japan’s turn toward Islam.”In historical writing, we tend to emphasize economic, political, or strategic motivations over other factors. In certain respects, it is simpler to rely on these categories because there is well-documented empirical evidence. Relying on this kind of empirical evidence, however, tends to omit or underrepresent ideological, spiritual, and emotional experiences that could have been significant forces in shaping Japan’s turn toward Islam. Even the claim itself of Japan’s turn toward Islam influenced individuals, how they chose to internalize, express, perform, or even manipulate tenets of the faith. This topic deserves further consideration and the burgeoning field of the history of emotions and senses could prove to be a useful lens in doing so. Scholars such as William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein provide frameworks particularly relevant to this discussion, namely their theories of emotional regimes and emotional communities. A new take on this history that examines how the Japanese state’s intrusion into religious life was experienced by individuals, and how the resulting emotions in turn shaped Japan’s Islam policy –as well as its other religious policies –could complicate the current discussion and provide a new understanding of this history. The subject lends itself to grappling with the psychological and emotional dimensions and repercussions of the state’s intrusion into religious life and Islam, and perhaps its later turn away from it. Finally, such a study offers a means of reflecting on the relationship between religion and politics today, as well as our own contributions to that relationship.
[1] Lu Zhenyu, “Japanese Jingoism and Islamic Policy,” Current Affairs Series, section 62 (1941): 18-23. Dacheng Modern China Journal Database (laokan.dachengdata.com). Translated from Chinese. Originally: 吕振 羽. “日本侵略主义的回教政策,” in 時事類編特刊 1941年第, 62期. 大成老旧刊. Translated into English by Fan Yang Aycock, February 20, 2016.
[2] Lu Zhenyu, “Japanese Jingoism and Islamic Policy,” Current Affairs Series, section 62 (1941): 18-23. Dacheng Modern China Journal Database (laokan.dachengdata.com). Translated from Chinese. Originally: 吕振 羽. “日本侵略主义的回教政策,” in 時事類編特刊 1941年第, 62期. 大成老旧刊. Translated into English by Fan Yang Aycock, February 20, 2016.
[3] Central File: Decimal File 894.404, Internal Affairs of States, Social Matters., Japan, Religion. Church., February 13, 1932 – July 12, 1939. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan, 1930-1939. U.S. National Archives. Archives Unbound.
[4] Central File: Decimal File 894.404, Internal Affairs of States, Social Matters., Japan, Religion. Church., August 24, 1940 – November 21, 1944. Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Japan, 1940-1944. U.S. National Archives. Archives Unbound
*Cover photo caption:
Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali and Japanese Politicians
From the back row left, Asuwa Kiyomi, Muhammad ‘Abd al-Hayy Qurban ‘Ali, Mavyar Shamkhnov (Tatar Imam of the Kobe Mosque), and Shimano Saburo
From the left front row, Ioki Ryozo, Inukai Tsuyoshi (signed the 1909 Muslim Oath), Toyama Mitsuru (also signed the oath), and Kojima Kazuo