
Introduction
How we think about modernity shapes what we think our tradition can do. For more than a century the question put to Islam has been whether it is compatible with modernity. Yet this question carries its own conclusion: it assumes that modernity is singular, that it is Western, and that the only real choice is between accommodating it and resisting it. By challenging this core assumption, this essay explores the new intellectual possibilities that emerge in its absence. What is at stake is more than a point of social theory; the picture of modernity we carry within ourselves decides which of our questions seem serious and which futures seem open to us. To see why, let us begin with the foundational narrative itself.1
The Modernisation Narrative and its Discontents
There is a story about modernity that has been told with such confidence, for so long, by so many serious people, that it has ceased to feel like a story at all. It feels like a description of reality. The story ran something like this.
Somewhere in early modern Western Europe, something began: the Scientific Revolution, the Reformation’s fracturing of religious authority, and the Enlightenment’s assertion of human reason as the sovereign arbiter of truth. From these interlocking transformations there emerged a new civilisational programme. This programme carried a set of core commitments: to individual autonomy over collective authority, to scientific rationality over revealed knowledge, to the differentiation of social life into distinct domains; politics, law, economics, science, art, each operating according to its own internal logic, none subordinate to the authority of religion. This was modernity. An order born in the West, and destined, through a combination of sword, commerce, and sheer civilisational confidence, to become the condition of all humanity.
A corollary to this story was a theory of secularisation. When societies modernise, so the argument runs, religion inevitably retreats from public institutions such as law, politics, and education, until, over time, faith leaks from the convictions of individuals themselves. The mechanisms were many, but four were identified above others: science displaces supernatural explanation; urbanisation and social mobility dissolve the communal networks in which traditional religiosity is embedded; institutional differentiation creates domains of life that operate without reference to religious authority; and pluralism, generated by modernity’s global spread, makes all religious claims relative, undermining any religion’s capacity to command absolute allegiance from its believers. The result, in the long run, would be a world that had outgrown its need for God.
This theory had serious intellectual architects. Max Weber’s account of rationalisation and disenchantment provided the philosophical foundations. Émile Durkheim argued that as traditional social bonds dissolved, the forms of collective life that religion had sustained would need new, secular bases.2 Talcott Parsons and his students, in the mid-twentieth century, built a comprehensive modernisation theory that predicted structural convergence toward secular liberal norms. Peter Berger, at least in his early work, argued that modernity produced a permanent condition of pluralism that was inherently secularising; the sacred canopy frays when you know your neighbours believe differently.3
The theory had direct political consequences. Development economics took it for granted that growth would produce the social conditions for liberal democracy. The end of the Cold War seemed to confirm everything. The classic statement was Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” thesis; this was the theoretical crystallisation of an assumption that was, at that moment, nearly universal among the Western-educated global elite: that the arc of history bent toward liberal secular democracy.4
This was the narrative. We swam in it as the fish swims in the sea, which is to say, we did not notice it at all. Yet what was perhaps less noticeable then is becoming harder to ignore. The world looks different. With the rise of China and the growing economic weight of Asia, the relative decline of Europe, democratic backtracking across the world, and a loss of confidence in democratic norms even in their heartlands, the confidence that the story of modernity ends with the world looking like the West is becoming harder to sustain. The idea that some societies are simply further along than others on a path that all must travel, all of them converging toward a single modernity, seems less and less plausible. What is striking is not that the narrative failed, but how many serious people continue to operate within it long after the evidence against it became overwhelming.
Peter Berger, one of the architects of the secularisation thesis, spent the final decades of his career acknowledging that he had been wrong all along, and noting, with characteristic intellectual honesty, that the thesis had survived most tenaciously not among the masses he had predicted would secularise, but rather among the Western-educated global elite and their counterparts in non-Western countries who had absorbed the same educational socialization.5 It is this class of liberal secular intellectuals, technocrats, journalists, and policymakers, which in Muslim-majority societies often dominates positions of institutional power, whose framework shapes what states express, regardless of where the population’s self-consciousness has moved. These elites absorbed the modernisation paradigm most thoroughly and built their political projects around it. Turkey is the clearest example: a secular-nationalist elite governing institutions whose framework diverged increasingly from the self-understanding of the population those institutions were supposed to serve. The gap between them was not just a developmental lag but a structural consequence of convergent modernity thinking being institutionalised in a state whose public had moved elsewhere.
For these elites, the expectation was always that modernisation would gradually produce a Muslim society that had successfully privatised religion, separated mosque from state, and entered the community of liberal secular nations as a full and equal member. Yet the repeated failure of this project, whether that be the electoral success of Islamist parties, the persistence of popular religious sentiment, the political earthquakes from the Iranian revolution to the Arab Spring, has been experienced not as evidence that the framework was wrong but rather as evidence that the process was being obstructed: by ignorance, by manipulation, by the failures of education or economic development. As usual the problem in this framing, is never with the theory; it is always with the people who haven’t lived up to it.
The Western foreign policy and academic establishment has fared no better. Analysts, think-tankers, and policymakers who spent the post-Cold War decade predicting that economic integration would produce political liberalisation across the Muslim world have spent the subsequent decades puzzling over why it did not. Their failure is structural: the frameworks they work within, modernisation theory, democratisation studies, development economics have not been fundamentally revised in light of the evidence to the contrary. Revision would require reconsidering not just individual predictions but the whole intellectual architecture on which careers, institutions, and policy programmes have been built.
It is easier to maintain that the process is incomplete than to acknowledge that the framework is wrong.
The vital question then becomes, if we take these theoretical alternatives seriously, what opens up in the clearing left by the narrative’s failure, particularly for those of us thinking from within the Islamic tradition?
One way to answer is to understand exactly what the standard narrative claims, and where it fails. There are at least two versions. The first is the strong version: that modernity leads toward liberal democracy, secularism, and the privatisation of religion, the Fukuyama claim, which the post-Cold War decade treated as settled and which the twenty-first century has comprehensively unsettled. The second claim is subtler: that modernity produces at least certain structural convergences, in urbanisation, mass education, the spread of capitalism and the nation-state form as the standard political form, regardless of civilisational inheritance. This second claim survives and is much harder to dismiss.
But there is a third dimension, and the one that concerns us most. Even granting that structural modernity has broken through globally, the question of how it is experienced; how it is narrated, how we understand ourselves in relation to it, what it means, and what relationship between the religious and the non-religious it generates; all of this remains genuinely open, and it is answered differently in different civilisational contexts. These contexts are neither identical nor hermetically sealed from one another. While they draw on their civilisational inheritances, they also overlap, akin to Wittgensteinian family resemblances: communities sharing overlapping features without any single feature common to all, recognisable to one another without being reducible to one another. You can squint and focus on the similarities, and yet the better you know them, the more you wonder how you could ever have mistaken them for each other.
At the level of multiple secularities, this plurality is most empirically visible and most theoretically tractable. Different civilisational communities generate different configurations of the religious and the non-religious within the shared conditions of structural modernity. And for the Islamic civilisational community, which concerns us most here, the mechanism by which this self-consciousness is currently being constituted and reconstituted is the transnational Muslim public sphere: a thoroughly modern formation, a product of globalisation and new communications technologies that simultaneously draws on and transforms the family of overlapping resemblances that constitute the Islamic tradition.
Now this essay unfolds in two parts. Part I clears the ground. We begin with, (i) Eisenstadt’s claim that modernity is plural, (ii) tests it against its hardest case, China, and its strongest objection, the weaker thesis that capitalism and the nation-state are modernity’s universal structure, and (iii) asks what is left of the “convergence story” once it has been tested, and what that does and does not settle. It then (iv) turns to secularity, where Casanova’s separation of “secularisation” into three distinct claims, and the Leipzig group’s shift from asking how secular a society is to asking what its secularity is for, both put pressure on the idea that Europe’s own settlement between the religious and the non-religious is the template for everyone else.
Part II brings these arguments to the Islamic world. It (v) asks what is distinctive in the Islamicate inheritance, the wider civilisation that Islam made, not only its law and theology, and what the multiple modernities framework can and cannot show; (vi) develops an account of Islamic civilisation under modern conditions as a family of overlapping resemblances, a community whose members recognise one another without sharing any single defining feature, constituted and contested through a transnational Muslim public sphere; and then (vii) tests it against the two dominant responses to modernity, anti-modern resistance and liberal secular accommodation.
In doing so, the essay builds on the multiple modernities framework while specifying more precisely how civilisational mediation of modernity actually works: what carries it, at what levels, and through what mechanisms. But we are getting ahead of ourselves. We need to begin where the standard story was most influentially challenged from inside the house that built it, from inside the social sciences themselves.
Eisenstadt and the Plurality of Modernities
One of the most important interventions in dismantling the theory of convergent modernity came from an unexpected direction, a sociologist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, whose intellectual formation owed more to Weber’s sociology of world religions than to the mainstream American modernisation theory he challenged.
Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt was born in Warsaw in 1923 and became one of the most important figures in comparative historical sociology in the second half of the twentieth century while spending most of his career in Jerusalem. His intellectual formation was Weberian in the deepest sense; attentive to the role of culture and religion in shaping institutions, resistant to crude economism, committed to taking seriously the internal logic of different civilisational traditions.6 He died in 2010, leaving behind an extraordinary body of work; publications on empire, political institutions, on axial age civilisations, as well as on modernity itself. But for our purposes, the place to begin is a single essay he published in the winter 2000 issue of Daedalus, the journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. It was titled “Multiple Modernities,” and it has since become one of the most cited and discussed pieces of sociological writing of the past quarter century.7
Eisenstadt’s argument directly challenged the dominant assumptions of modernisation theory, which had shaped social science since the 1950s. Much of classical sociological theory, especially in its later modernisation-theory interpretation, inherited an assumption that modernity represented a broadly unified historical trajectory originating in Western Europe. The underlying expectation was that societies would gradually converge upon a common institutional and cultural model: industrial capitalism, bureaucratic administration, liberal constitutionalism, secularisation, and individualism.8
Eisenstadt argued that this assumption was not borne out historically. The “homogenising and hegemonic assumptions” of the modernisation programme were not realised.9 Instead, societies that had undergone modern transformations developed institutional forms that were not simply transitional stages towards Western modernity, but genuinely distinctive configurations of modern life.
This was not solely an empirical observation about the persistence of cultural difference, but a theoretical claim about the nature of modernity. Eisenstadt argued that modernity was not a single package; it’s not industrialisation plus liberal democracy plus secularism plus individualism. Rather, modernity should be understood as a set of structural transformations, in politics, economy, law, that can be combined with radically different cultural orientations, understandings of collective identity, and different institutional responses generated by what these transformations created, and continue to create. All these societies developed their own modern dynamics and modes of interpretation, for which the original Western project constituted the crucial, and usually deeply ambivalent, reference point.10
The institutional forms that emerged outside the West were therefore not incomplete versions of Western modernity. They were distinctively modern configurations shaped by their own historical inheritances, civilisational resources, and interpretive frameworks. The Western experience remained the central and often unavoidable reference point, but it was not the only possible expression of modernity.
One of Eisenstadt’s most challenging claims is that even the rejection of Western modernity is itself a characteristically modern phenomenon.11 Anti-Western movements, nationalist revivalisms, religious political movements, often rely upon modern forms of organisation, mass mobilisation, print culture, media technologies, and bureaucratic structures.
Modernity cannot be refused, there is no outside it, it cannot be escaped through a return to a premodern condition; it can only be interpreted, negotiated and contested from within.
What makes the Multiple Modernities framework so suggestive is that it avoids two opposing mistakes. On one side, it rejects universalism: the assumption that modernity necessarily produces the same institutions and cultural forms everywhere. On the other side, it avoids particularism: the idea that every civilisation is so unique that meaningful comparison becomes impossible. Eisenstadt’s argument preserves both claims simultaneously; modernity is a global historical condition, but there are many ways of becoming modern.
This point is worth underlining, modernity is real; it is not an ideology, it is not purely a discourse, it is not a western imposition that can be wished away. It refers to a set of profound structural transformations: industrialisation, capitalism, bureaucratic administration, nation states, mass education, science, constitutional politics, and global markets, among others. These transformations produce real pressures and possibilities that societies must respond to. This does not mean that the categories through which modern transformations are understood are neutral. Modernity is both a material historical condition and an interpretive framework through which societies make sense of those transformations.
Yet this does not mean that modernity is interpreted identically everywhere. Although modern transformations create similar pressures, societies encounter them through inherited traditions, memories, institutions, and systems of meaning. Confucian China, Orthodox Russia, Islamic societies, Hindu India, and Western Europe do not become copies of one another because they’ve undergone processes of modernisation. Their histories, religions, institutions, and collective memories continue to matter. Modernity is always locally interpreted, and shaped by civilisational inheritances, inheritances that do not dissolve in contact with modernity’s demands.
These resulting configurations are genuinely new, they are not survivals of a premodern past; but neither are they variations on a single Western model. Islamic modernity, for example, is not medieval Islam continuing unchanged. Modern Islamic politics: constitutionalism, Islamic banking, Islamist movements, democratic parties, and so on, are all genuinely modern creations, products of engagement with modern institutions and conditions. At the same time, they are not simply Western modernity with Islamic decoration. Nor is Japanese modernity merely Western modernity translated into Japanese. The civilisational inheritances actively shape institutions, political imagination, concepts of authority, and understandings of the self. The differences are structural rather than ornamental; they are different modernities.
The Strong Civilisational Programme, and its Ambiguities
What elevates Eisenstadt’s framework beyond the familiar observation that different cultures handle modernity differently is what scholars have called his strong civilisational theory. Civilisations, on this account, are not solely bundles of cultural habit, ethnic tradition, or religious practice. They are constituted by distinctive cultural programmes: deep orientations toward the relationship between the transcendent and the mundane order, characteristic understandings of human agency and social solidarity, and enduring tensions that structure how communities interpret themselves across generations.
Let’s consider a concrete example; to say there is an Islamic civilisation is not to say that “Muslims do things differently.” It is to suggest that Islamic traditions contain a specific set of intellectual commitments and institutional inheritances that have historically organised Islamic intellectual and political life and shape how modern transformations are understood and negotiated today. One prominent example is the integration of law, spirituality, ethics as well as theology within a specific jurisprudential tradition; the idea that there is a sanctified legal order that permeates all domains of human life is an oft-remarked distinction that has no close parallel in the Christian West, which had developed its own distinctive tensions around the relationship between spiritual and temporal authority. Another example is the idea of the umma as a transnational concept that creates a tension with the logic of the modern nation-state. Another is the tradition of ijtihād, the exercise of independent reasoning to derive legal rulings from the divine sources, which offers a different mechanism of adaptation that is different from secular revision without being simple traditionalism. These are not purely surface cultural features. They represent deeper structures that influence how Islamic societies engage with modern political, legal, and social transformations. However, this should not be understood as implying a fixed Islamic essence. Civilisational programmes do not operate through consensus. They exist through continuous argument, reinterpretation, and contestation.
These civilisational programmes are carried and transmitted by what Eisenstadt calls autonomous elites, groups with the authority and capacity to interpret the tradition and mobilise it in response to new historical conditions. In the Islamic case, the classical example has been the ʿulamāʾ, who historically performed the role of interpreting, preserving, and transmitting Islamic knowledge. What is distinctively modern about the Islamic encounter with modernity is precisely the transformation of this authority structure. In the twentieth century, new forms of Islamic intellectual authority emerged: engineers turned ideologues, physicians who became Quranic interpreters, and lay intellectuals asserting the right to engage directly with Islamic sources without traditional scholarly formation. All of these developments have challenged the exclusive interpretive authority of the ʿulamāʾ and transformed the terrain upon which Islamic self-understanding takes place.
Yet Eisenstadt’s autonomous elites should not be understood as disappearing under modern conditions. Eickelman and Piscatori’s work on Muslim politics demonstrates how modernity has transformed the composition of the Islamic interpretive class through print, mass education, television, and digital media. Islamic knowledge became increasingly objectified and accessible, widening participation in debates over religious meaning and authority.12 At the same time, as Zaman’s work on contemporary ʿulamāʾ demonstrates, traditionally trained scholars have not simply been displaced. Many have adapted by engaging new audiences, using modern communication technologies, and addressing contemporary political and intellectual questions. The result is not the disappearance of traditional authority but the transformation and pluralisation of the groups capable of claiming religious authority.13
This reveals an important ambiguity in Eisenstadt’s framework. He often operates across three distinct levels that require analytical separation.
The first is civilisational self-consciousness: the collective awareness of belonging to a shared cultural programme, the sense, both individual and communal, of participating in a tradition that has its own distinctive way of engaging the world. This is closest to what Casanova calls an imagined community, borrowing from Benedict Anderson,14 not a formal doctrine but a background understanding of how things are and how they fit together, carried in practices, narratives, and symbols as much as in explicit argument.15
The second is institutional expression: the actual organisations, legal systems, states, and educational structures through which self-consciousness is partially realised. Institutions are always slower than ideas. They crystallise earlier settlements and carry the weight of political compromise, resource constraints, and bureaucratic inertia. The gap between where a civilisational self-consciousness has moved and where its institutional expression still stands is one of the most consequential features of any modern society.
The third is the mediating autonomous elites: the groups, classically, the ʿulamāʾ in the Islamic case, who carry, interpret, and transmit the cultural programme between the level of self-consciousness and the level of institutions. Eisenstadt’s autonomous elites are what make civilisational self-consciousness more than mere sentiment: they are the figures who articulate it, contest its boundaries, and translate it into institutional forms.
The relationship between these three levels is precisely where Eisenstadt’s framework requires further development. How do transformations in collective self-understanding become institutional change? How do elites mediate between inherited traditions and new conditions? And how do institutions themselves reshape the self-understanding of communities?
The multiple modernities framework therefore points toward a more dynamic claim. The modern Muslim encounter is not merely a matter of preserving tradition or adopting Western institutions. It is a continuing struggle over the meaning of inherited traditions under modern conditions, mediated through changing intellectual elites, contested publics, and evolving institutions.
Islamic civilisation, then, is not a fixed cultural programme producing a predetermined modernity. It is a field of ongoing contestation over how modern transformations should be interpreted, which authorities should define their meaning, and what institutional forms should emerge from that interpretation. The question that both the convergence thesis and the anti-modern critique prematurely close is not whether Islam can become modern, nor whether modernity can simply displace Islamic tradition. The deeper question is how Islamic traditions negotiate the conditions of modernity and what forms of political, legal, and social life emerge from that negotiation.
For Eisenstadt then, these civilisational programmes are not static essences: they neither resist modernity nor survive it unchanged. Rather, they are dynamic frameworks within which the encounter with modernity is interpreted; frameworks through which societies encounter modernity, shaping what is appropriated, what is rejected, and how that encounter is woven into the stories societies tell themselves. This process of continual transformation implies neither a Fukuyamian end of history nor a Huntingtonian clash of civilisations. Both approaches assume a more a static relationship between civilisational identity and historical change. Instead, modernity is continuously reinterpreted, contested, and reconstructed by societies as they encounter it on their own terms.16
China and the Strong Claim, and What Survives
For decades after Eisenstadt first developed these arguments, the multiple modernities framework remained a powerful theoretical proposal that ran somewhat ahead of its empirical confirmation. Japan was the example most cited as a non-Western society that had modernised without becoming Western; a society that industrialised rapidly, built recognisably modern institutions, and yet remained in fundamental respects non-Western in its social organisation and cultural orientation. Scholars of East Asian modernity had already begun to argue that Confucian civilisational inheritance was shaping distinctively different developmental paths across the region, not merely at the cultural surface but in the institutional logic of the state, the firm, and the family.17
However, Japan was easily assimilated by convergence theorists; they could argue that its traditional cultural distinctiveness was temporary and would gradually disappear. Japan had already adopted the parliamentary-democratic political form that convergence theory predicted and therefore could be absorbed as confirmation rather than refutation of the thesis. It was an awkward exhibit for multiple modernities framework, precisely because the convergence theorist could point to it and say: yes, exactly, the cultural surface differs but the political logic converged.
Yet, this framework faces a serious conceptual objection that must be addressed before moving forward. The critics of multiple modernities, at least in their strongest versions, do not simply deny that cultural difference exists.18 They argue something more specific: what appear to be genuinely different modernities are in fact one modernity with different surface expressions; beneath the cultural variation, the nature of the bureaucratic state, the structural logic of the market, and technological rationality are all doing modernity’s homogenising work regardless of civilisational inheritance. On this account, any divergence is merely temporary, the march towards a convergent modernity is relentless and inevitable.
This is a serious objection to the multiple modernities framework. For a long time, it remained genuinely difficult to answer, so long as the available counterevidence was confined to cases that could be absorbed, like Japan, or to smaller economies at the margins of the global system. The twenty-first century, however, has produced a counterexample so economically significant, politically powerful, and institutionally sophisticated that it has become increasingly difficult to dismiss as an exceptional case.
China presents the strongest challenge to the convergence thesis. It has been deeply integrated into global capitalism for four decades, developed the largest middle class in human history, and built universities and research institutions of global significance. If economic development and structural modernisation were destined to generate liberal democratic convergence, China has had ample time and material to do so. Yet this isn’t what happened. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party has increasingly articulated a distinct account of Chinese modernity, drawing selectively upon Confucian themes of social harmony, hierarchical authority, and collective obligation, presenting these not as obstacles to modernisation but as resources for it.19 Now, one does not have to admire the Chinese model to recognise what it demonstrates theoretically; the liberal consensus of the 1990s, which regarded the end of the Cold War as confirmation of liberalism’s universal historical trajectory, did not survive contact with the twenty-first century.
The central question is therefore no longer whether societies modernise, but how modernity is interpreted, institutionalised, and contested within different historical contexts.
Yet caution is required. China may represent an important challenge to convergence theory, but we should be careful about how much theoretical weight it can bear as an example of multiple modernities. Before treating it as a definitive proof of concept for Eisenstadt’s framework, two objections deserve attention.
The first is that China’s divergence from liberal democracy may not reflect a deep civilisational programme in Eisenstadt’s sense. It may also be explained by political contingency: the survival and adaptation of a Leninist party-state that proved more resilient than its Soviet counterpart. Civilisational explanations and authoritarian path dependencies can produce similar outcomes, and distinguishing between these explanations empirically is not always straightforward.
A second objection is more incisive. The strong convergence thesis, most famously associated with Fukuyama’s claim that liberal democracy represented the culmination of modern political development, has failed. But a weaker convergence claim survives: that capitalism, rather than liberal democracy specifically, is the universal feature of modernity. For even if China has not become a liberal democracy, it has unambiguously been incorporated into global capitalism: through global markets, supply chains, financial instruments, and the consumerist social forms that accompany them. State-directed capitalism remains capitalism, even if its durability proved difficult for many theorists of the 1990s to anticipate.20
This is the argument advanced by the varieties-of-capitalism literature. What appears to be multiple modernities may instead represent multiple institutional arrangements within a single capitalist world-system.21 Different societies organise capitalism differently: through coordinated market economies, developmental states, or state-directed investment models. Yet beneath these variations remains the structural logic of capital accumulation, market integration, and economic rationalisation. On this account, perhaps what Eisenstadt describes as multiple modernities may be better understood as different configurations of a single capitalist modernity.
Such a concession suggests that even if multiple modernities defeat the strong convergence claim about liberal democracy, it still faces the weaker claim that capitalism provides the universal structural framework of modernity. And this challenge becomes sharper when we attend to what has actually happened across the world at the structural level over the past two centuries.
The Global Structural Transformations of Modernity
The historian Eric Hobsbawm, reflecting on the transformations of the twentieth century, described what he called “the greatest and most dramatic, rapid and universal transformation in human history.” For most of humanity, traditional premodern ways of life effectively ended in the middle decades of the twentieth century. As Hobsbawm observed, “for 80 per cent of humanity the Middle Ages suddenly ended in the 1950s; or perhaps better still, they were felt to end in the 1960s.” The sociologist Volker Schmidt, drawing on this observation, identifies several structural transformations that occurred across almost all societies, irrespective of civilisational inheritance. For the purposes of illustration, we focus on four: the end of agrarian society, the expansion of mass education and knowledge, the transformation of personhood, citizenship, and gender relations, and the universalisation of the nation-state.22
1. The End of Agrarian Society
For millennia, agricultural labour defined the basic conditions of human existence. The overwhelming majority of people lived within agrarian communities whose social structures, political hierarchies, and cultural rhythms were organised around land and agricultural production. In roughly two centuries, this arrangement was transformed almost entirely through industrialisation and urbanisation. It was not until 1990 that the peasantry became a global minority. Two hundred years ago, only 2.5 per cent of the world’s population lived in cities with more than twenty thousand inhabitants; since 2007, for the first time in human history, more than half of humanity has lived in urban environments. Modernity therefore represents not simply economic development, but a fundamental reorganisation of human settlement and social life.
2. The Universalisation of Mass Education and Knowledge
Modernity also produced the unprecedented expansion and institutionalisation of education. Beginning in northwestern Europe and North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, compulsory education spread rapidly after 1945 through processes of state-building and decolonisation. By 1985, compulsory education existed in approximately 80 per cent of the world’s countries. Between 1970 and 1990, global literacy rates rose from 48 to 75 per cent. Mass education became one of the defining institutions of modern society, transforming not only levels of knowledge but also the distribution of authority, political participation, and social self-understanding.
3. The Transformation of Personhood, Citizenship, and Gender Relations
A third transformation concerns the changing status of women within modern societies. Across the last century, women have increasingly gained recognition as legal persons and citizens, while participation in education and labour markets has expanded worldwide. Beginning in Europe and North America and accelerating after the Second World War, these transformations have spread unevenly but have affected every world region. Modernity has therefore reshaped not only institutions but fundamental assumptions concerning personhood, rights, citizenship, and the organisation of social relations.
4. The Universalisation of the Nation-State as the Political Form of Modernity
The fourth transformation is the universalisation of the nation-state as the dominant political form of modernity. Political life became organised around bounded, sovereign, bureaucratically administered territorial units, equipped with standardised legal systems, national currencies, and permanent administrative institutions. This may be the most structurally decisive transformation of all: a political form that emerged from a specific European historical trajectory has become the framework within which every civilisational tradition must now organise political life.
Schmidt’s conclusion is direct: modernity has broken through globally. For the first time since its early manifestations in Renaissance Europe, it has begun to touch and shape the lives of the majority of the world’s population. The weak convergence thesis therefore has something real to hold onto. Yet, as Frederick Cooper has suggested, both “single modernity” and “multiple modernities” may be instruments too blunt for the work required: the first obscuring real structural variation, the second potentially underestimating the depth of shared structural transformation.23
Granting the weak convergence thesis, that structural modernity has broken through globally, does not settle the question of what modernity means in any given context, how it is experienced, what relationship between the religious and non-religious it generates, or through what civilisational resources it is mediated and interpreted. The weak claim establishes that all modern societies share certain structural features. It does not establish that they share the same understanding of those features, the same institutional resolution to the tensions they generate, or the same configuration of the religious and non-religious within them.
This is the relationship that the multiple modernities framework seeks to illuminate: the relationship between universal structural transformations and the diverse ways societies interpret, institutionalise, and give meaning to them. It is precisely here that José Casanova intervenes, providing the crucial bridge between this framework and the question of secularity.
Secularity, Meaning and Cultural Inheritance
The sociologist of religion José Casanova, engaging directly with the multiple modernities debate, brings a crucial clarification to the question. The multiple modernities position, he argues, “rejects both the notion of a modern radical break with traditions as well as the notion of an essential modern continuity with tradition.” All traditions and civilizations are radically transformed in the processes of modernization, but they also have the possibility of shaping in particular ways the institutionalization of modern traits.”24 The structural transformations Schmidt identifies are real, and Eisenstadt would not deny them. What Eisenstadt insists, and what Casanova’s own work on religion demonstrates, is that these transformations do not determine the cultural and religious forms that emerge in their wake. Structural convergence is real, but it does not settle the question of how societies understand, negotiate, and institutionalise the relationship between the religious and the non-religious under conditions of modernity.
This becomes especially clear when we examine secularisation as a category. Casanova argues that secularisation is a genuine historical process, but it is not a universal developmental law applicable to all religious traditions in all civilisational contexts. Rather, it is the specific history of the transformation of Western European Christianity from the medieval period to the modern age.25 The concept carries within it assumptions rooted in the particular relationship between the Christian Church, political authority, and intellectual life in Western Europe. When exported as a universal category, these assumptions can generate significant category errors when applied to other civilisational traditions.
Consider Casanova’s comparison with Chinese religion. To secularise, in its original meaning, is to “make worldly”: to transfer persons, institutions, or domains from ecclesiastical authority into civil use. This presupposes a prior distinction between an ecclesiastical sphere and a worldly sphere, a distinction deeply embedded in Western Christian institutional history. But traditions such as Confucianism and Daoism have not historically been organised around an ecclesiastical structure in this sense, nor have they existed in the same kind of tension with the mundane world. For such traditions, secularisation as “making worldly” has limited explanatory value. They do not need to secularise in this sense because they were never ecclesiastical to begin with. Consequently, the Chinese case exposes the limits of treating secularisation as a universal model of religious change.26
The implication for the Islamic case is significant, though the comparison is not identical. Islam does not possess a church in the Christian sense, with a single institutional authority analogous to medieval Western Christianity. Yet Islam also differs substantially from Chinese traditions in its relationship to the mundane world. Many Muslims argue that the sharīʿa represents precisely a claim that worldly affairs can be governed in accordance with divine command, producing a distinctive relationship between religious authority and social order. The point, therefore, is not that Islam and Confucianism occupy the same position, but that neither can simply be treated as a variation of the Western Christian historical trajectory. Different civilisational traditions generate different configurations of religion, authority, and secularity, and therefore cannot be expected to secularise in the same way, on the same timeline, or towards the same destination.27
Casanova argues that the universalisation of Western secular modernity through colonialism and capitalism has often imposed this particular historical trajectory as the implicit standard against which all other traditions are measured. Other societies are then approached through a familiar binary: how does this tradition respond to secular modernity? Does it accommodate or resist? Does it liberalise or become fundamentalist? Yet this framing already assumes that secularisation follows a single historical path. It obscures the possibility that different civilisational traditions may generate alternative relationships between the religious and the non-religious while still participating fully in modernity.28
The value of the multiple modernities framework does not lie primarily in denying the shared structural transformations of modernity, where the weaker convergence thesis retains genuine force. Its greater analytical value lies in illuminating how different civilisational traditions interpret, negotiate, and institutionalise those transformations, particularly in relation to the boundaries between the religious and the non-religious.
Multiple Secularities
The step from Eisenstadt’s multiple modernities to multiple secularities is a short but essential one. If different civilisational traditions generate different modernities, they may also generate different relationships between the religious and the non-religious. Yet before this claim can even be evaluated, we must confront a surprisingly basic problem: much of the debate about secularisation has proceeded as though it referred to a single historical process, when in fact the term is routinely used to describe several analytically distinct phenomena. Unless these are disentangled, discussions about Islam, religion, and modernity inevitably talk past one another. It was precisely this confusion that José Casanova sought to clarify in Public Religions in the Modern World, now recognised as one of the foundational works in the contemporary sociology of religion.29 Casanova argued that the single word “secularisation” had come to encompass three distinct claims, each with a different empirical status and each requiring separate evaluation. One describes a structural feature of modernity itself. A second proposes a sociological prediction about the fate of religion. The third advances a normative political ideal. Much of the modern debate has gone wrong because these claims have been treated as though they were one and the same.
The first is differentiation: the structural process through which modern societies develop relatively autonomous spheres, be that in politics, law, science, the economy, and the arts, each with its own internal logic and forms of authority. Casanova argues that this process is genuinely constitutive of modernity.30 In medieval Western Christendom, the Church claimed authority across many of these domains. Modernity progressively differentiated them, allowing politics, science, and law to acquire increasing institutional autonomy. Yet differentiation need not take a uniquely Western form. Islamic jurisprudence, for example, has long distinguished between ʿibādāt (acts of worship) and muʿāmalāt (social transactions), recognising different modes of legal reasoning within different domains of life. This is not secularisation in the Western sense, but it demonstrates that differentiation itself can emerge through different civilisational traditions.
The second is decline: the claim that modernisation inevitably leads to the erosion of religious belief and practice as science, bureaucracy, and urbanisation displace traditional forms of authority. This is the claim that is most familiar in popular discussions of secularization, as well as the aspect that has been most decisively challenged by historical developments. The persistence of religion in the United States, the dramatic expansion of Christianity and Islam across Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Islamic Revival that has characterised much of the Muslim world since the 1970s all suggest that religious vitality is fully compatible with advanced modernity.31 Rather than representing survivals from a premodern past, these movements have themselves been mediated through mass education, global communications, and modern political organisation.
The third is privatisation: the normative claim that religion ought to be confined to the private sphere and excluded from public life. This is not a sociological description of what modernity necessarily does to religion, but a political programme, what Casanova calls secularism proper.32 Many modern societies have explicitly rejected this settlement. Indeed, one of the defining features of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries has been what Casanova describes as the “deprivatisation” of religion: the re-emergence of religious actors, arguments, and movements within public life, from Solidarity in Poland and liberation theology in Latin America to the Islamic Revival across the Muslim world. What Casanova argues, and what may be surprising from within the Western European experience, is that religion’s presence in public life is not necessarily a symptom of incomplete modernity. Rather, it is a feature of modernity itself in many of its actually existing forms.
These three processes are therefore analytically independent. Differentiation can occur without religious decline. Religious decline can occur without privatisation becoming a political programme. Once these distinctions are kept in view, the contribution of the multiple secularities framework becomes much clearer. The question is no longer whether a society is simply “more” or “less” secular. Rather, it becomes how different societies differentiate religious and non-religious spheres, what purposes those differentiations serve, and what cultural and historical resources they draw upon. It is precisely this variation, rather than a universal trajectory towards religious decline, that the multiple secularities framework seeks to explain.
The Leipzig Intervention
So far, we have asked what ‘secularisation’ means. The harder question is how to study the variation once the single trajectory has gone, and that is what a research group in Leipzig set out to do. The Humanities Centre for Advanced Studies “Multiple Secularities — Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” was established at Leipzig University, under the direction of the sociologist Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and the historian of religion Christoph Kleine.33 Secularity, as the group develops the concept, describes how conceptual distinctions and institutional differentiations are made between religious and non-religious spheres and practices, and crucially, what those distinctions are for.34 It is not just about separating religion from everyday life; it is an active, purposeful process of drawing lines between the religious and the non-religious.
The Leipzig group develops this into a typology organised around what they call guiding ideas — the reference problems that different configurations of secularity address. The group distinguishes four basic types: a) secularity organised around individual liberty; b) secularity organised around the balancing of religious diversity; c) secularity organised around national integration; and d) secularity organised around the independent development of functional social sub-systems.35
The essay’s central claim is that modernity is experienced differently through different civilisational communities; that structural convergence does not determine the meaning-making dimensions of modern life. Yet such a claim, stated at the level of Eisenstadt’s cultural programmes, remains rather abstract. It says: civilisational difference is real and consequential, but it does not yet show where that difference is visible or what it consists of in practice. This is where the Leipzig typology is so useful: it is the bridge from conceptual framework to empirical demonstration. It takes an abstract claim and gives it a specific, studiable form. Rather than asking “how much” secularity a society has, or charting the retreat of religion along a straight line, it asks what form its secularity takes, what problem it is deployed to solve, and what cultural resources it draws on in doing so.
What makes this typology powerful is that it allows you to ask, of any given society or historical moment, not “is this secular?”but “what is this secularity for?” Without that question, the comparison between France, East Germany, Indonesia, and Iran is only a list of differences devoid of any explanatory power. With it, they become evidence of a structural argument: that different civilisational inheritances generate different reference problems, and different reference problems generate genuinely different configurations of the religious and the non-religious. This approach is deeply pertinent to the study of Muslim-majority contexts. While Turkish laicism, Indonesian Pancasila, and the Iranian wilāyat al-faqīh all represent secularity configurations, they remain radically divergent. By applying this typology, we can decipher their structural variations: each is organised around its own guiding ideas, addresses a specific reference problem, and reinterprets a shared civilizational inheritance in its own way. By exposing this underlying structure, the typology transforms a mere list of cases into a coherent family of resemblances.
Europe’s Own Plurality
The Leipzig findings begin by challenging the assumption that European secularity represents a singular, coherent model that the rest of the world merely fails to replicate.
French laïcité is a secularity organised around the problem of national integration.36 The Wars of Religion and the French Revolution’s assault on clerical power produced a settlement in which the condition of civic peace was the constitutive exclusion of religion from public life. The headscarf controversies in French schools are not incidental to laïcité, indeed, they manifest its core logic. In this framework, the state insists that civic integration requires individuals to strip away public religious markers to participate in the political sphere.
British secularity is different in kind and logic. Never having undergone the French experience of revolutionary anti-clericalism, Britain developed a pragmatic, negotiated relationship between established religion and public life. This is a secularity organised around the balancing of diversity rather than the exclusion of religion.37
Most striking is the case of the former East Germany, where decades of enforced state atheism produced some of the most comprehensively secular populations in the world. This is a secularity shaped not by Enlightenment liberalism but by coercion, yet decades afterwards, it is now transmitted as cultural inheritance rather than an ideological commitment.38 Surprisingly, non-religion in the former GDR is not a position people have argued themselves into, but the baseline reality that they grew up with.
So, we seem to have three European cases, with three distinct configurations of secularity. The model that was supposed to serve as a universal template, we find, turns out to be fractured and plural from its very inception.
And that is where Part I leaves us. The story of a single modernity heading towards a single secular destination has lost its strong form and kept only a weak one. Secularity itself has proved to be plural, revealing itself as many distinct things even in its birthplace. The question now stands before us: what does this shift mean for the Islamic world, a civilisation that was never merely a variation on the European story to begin with? That is the task of Part II.
Faheem A. Hussain is a PhD candidate at Cardiff University, researching the intersections between religion, politics and philosophy. He has a BA (Hons.) in Arabic and Islamic Studies from the School of Oriental and African Studies, London, a PGCE in Religious Studies from Roehampton University, and an MA in Philosophy from Heythrop College, University of London. His writings can be found on Substack (https://faheemahussain.substack.com/) and occasionally on Twitter/X @FaheemAMHussain.
Notes
1. I am deeply indebted to Rasheed Gonzales, Tahmid Ahmed, Ahmed Jeddo, Syed Hassan Raza, Adam J. Frost, Daniyal Ahmed, and Shaykh Tariq al-Tamimi for reading sections and earlier drafts of this text, and for their thoughtful feedback and generous insights. I have benefited from extended conversations with Tahmid and especially Ahmed who has been the inspiration and cause of this essay—though of course they bear no responsibility for any errors that remain. All opinions expressed, and any mistakes, are entirely my own. ↩
2. Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. Talcott Parsons (London: Allen & Unwin, 1930); Émile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. Karen Fields (New York: Free Press, 1995 [1912]). ↩
3. Peter Berger, The Sacred Canopy: Elements of a Sociological Theory of Religion. Berger later substantially revised this position; see his edited volume The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics where he acknowledges that the secularisation thesis was largely mistaken. ↩
4. The foundational sociological statement is Talcott Parsons, The Social System and Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives which predicted structural convergence toward a common modern institutional form. Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last Man represents the most influential popular crystallisation of the same thesis in its post-Cold War political register. ↩
5. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: Resurgent Religion and World Politics ↩
6. On Eisenstadt’s Weberian intellectual formation and his relationship to classical sociological theory, see Björn Wittrock, “The Axial Age in Global History: Cultural Crystallizations and Societal Transformations,” in The Axial Age and Its Consequences, ed. Robert Bellah and Hans Joas (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 102–25. ↩
7. S. N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” Daedalus 129, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 1–29. The essay serves as the introduction to a special issue of Daedalus devoted to the theme; subsequent essays in that volume develop the argument across different civilisational contexts. ↩
8. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities” 3. ↩
9. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities” , 3. ↩
10. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” , 2–3. For the fuller elaboration of Eisenstadt’s civilisational approach, see his Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities, 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2003). ↩
11. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” 5. ↩
12. Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori, Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), especially ch. 2, on the fragmentation of religious authority and the objectification of Islamic knowledge. ↩
13. On the new generation of ʿulamāʾ responding to this challenge, see Muhammad Qasim Zaman, The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), especially ch. 1 and the conclusion. ↩
14. Casanova, “Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization,” 429. The deterritorialisation argument draws on Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991). Casanova’s examples of the Catholic Church and Pentecostalism appear at 430–35. ↩
15. José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 19–39. On secularity as distinct from secularism, and on the social imaginary concept as applied to religion, see also Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), especially ch. 4. ↩
16. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities,” 5. ↩
17. Tu Wei-ming, “Multiple Modernities: A Preliminary Inquiry into the Implications of East Asian Modernity,” in Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, ed. Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 256–67. ↩
18. See Volker H. Schmidt, “Multiple Modernities or Varieties of Modernity?” Current Sociology 54, no. 1 (2006): 77–97, at 88–91. Stavit Sinai, “The Analytical Incoherence of the Multiple Modernities Thesis,” European Journal of Social Theory 23, no. 3 (2020): 339–56. ↩
19. On Chinese civilisational nationalism and the Confucian revival under Xi Jinping, see Daniel A. Bell, The China Model: Political Meritocracy and the Limits of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015). ↩
20. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). The framework argues that liberal market economies and coordinated market economies follow different institutional logics, but both remain capitalisms, with the structural logic of capital accumulation operating as a homogenising force beneath those institutional variations. ↩
21. Peter A. Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). ↩
22. Volker H. Schmidt, “What’s Wrong with the Concept of Multiple Modernities?” Working Paper Series of the Research Network 1989, no. 6 (Berlin, 2008), Schmidt draws on Eric Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991 (London: Michael Joseph, 1994), 288. ↩
23. Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), especially ch. 5, “Modernity.” ↩
24. José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252–67, at 255–56. ↩
25. José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252–67, at 255–56. ↩
26. José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252–67, at 257–59. ↩
27. José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252–67, 257–59. ↩
28. José Casanova, “Cosmopolitanism, the Clash of Civilizations and Multiple Modernities,” Current Sociology 59, no. 2 (2011): 252–67, 257–59. ↩
29. José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World. ↩
30. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 211–34. ↩
31. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World., 5–6. On the deprivatisation of religion as a global phenomenon, see José Casanova, “Religion, the New Millennium, and Globalization,” Sociology of Religion 62, no. 4 (2001): 415–41. ↩
32. Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World., 5–6. ↩
33. Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities,” Comparative Sociology 11 (2012): 875–909. The research programme is described in Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Preliminary Findings and Outlook of the CASHSS ‘Multiple Secularities — Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities,'” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities,” no. 22 (Leipzig University, 2020). ↩
34. Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities,,” 883. ↩
35. Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt, “Multiple Secularities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities,,”, 887. The four types are developed with illustrative case studies across the article; for the typology in condensed form, see also Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Multiple Secularities and Their Normativity as an Empirical Subject,” The Immanent Frame, December 13, 2011. The connection to Weber’s concept of Leitideen is noted in the Leipzig group’s own methodological statements. ↩
36. On French laïcité and its specific historical formation, see John Bowen, Why the French Don’t Like Headscarves: Islam, the State, and Public Space (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). ↩
37. On British secularity as organised around the pragmatic balancing of religious diversity rather than the exclusion of religion, see Grace Davie, Religion in Britain: A Persistent Paradox (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015), especially ch. 3. ↩
38. On East German secularity as cultural inheritance, see Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, Uta Karstein, and Thomas Schmidt-Lux, Forcierte Säkularität: Religiöser Wandel und Generationendynamik im Osten Deutschlands (Frankfurt: Campus, 2009). See also “Forced” Secularity? On the Appropriation of Repressive Secularization. (2020). Religion and Society in Central and Eastern Europe, 4(1), 63-77. ↩
