This paper was first presented at the “Reclaiming History: Islam and Cultural Patrimony in the Twenty-First Century” Conference, organized by the Abu Sulayman Center for Global Islamic Studies at George Mason University, April 24-25, 2025.
The processes that, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, led to the collapse of socialist regimes across European countries did not bypass Yugoslavia.[1] The socialist state, which emerged from the legacy of the partisan struggle against fascists and occupiers, experienced an almost complete disintegration little more than a decade after the death of Josip Broz Tito, the pivotal figure of the Yugoslav state during both the wartime and postwar periods.[2] Figures such as Slobodan Milošević and Franjo Tuđman, who at various times held highly influential positions within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, emerged in the 1990s as leaders of national parties and exerted significant influence over the course of the ensuing wartime developments.[3]
In the same period, several socialist republics within the Yugoslav federation embarked on the pursuit of independence, including Bosnia and Herzegovina. A complicating factor on its path to sovereignty was the heterogeneity of its population.[4] The Bosnian Serbs largely opposed Bosnia and Herzegovina’s secession from Yugoslavia, even though a 1992 referendum on the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina saw its people opt for secession from Yugoslavia, thereby following the path already taken by Slovenia and Croatia.[5] However, Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly its Muslim population, would pay the highest price for the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The referendum marked the beginning of aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, which ultimately lasted from 1992 to 1995, spearheaded by Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat armies with continuous support from the neighboring states of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, present-day Serbia and Montenegro, as well as the Republic of Croatia.[6]
Over the course of the war, numerous crimes and acts of ethnic cleansing were perpetrated across large parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, culminating in the genocide committed against the Muslim population of Srebrenica in 1995 by Bosnian Serb forces. This genocide been documented through various verdicts of the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, as well as the Resolution on the Srebrenica Genocide adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in May 2024.[7] However, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that there were other verdicts on genocide committed against the Bosniak population during the aggression of 1992-1995, which demonstrate that genocidal intent was not confined solely to the area of Srebrenica. In fact, the first genocide conviction on European soil after the Second World War was the verdict against Nikola Jorgić for crimes committed in the Bosnian villages of Grapska and Ševarlije, delivered by the Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1997.[8]
The conflict was brought to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995,[9] but not before a tremendous loss of human lives and material resources, the destruction of the economy, widespread migrations, and a myriad of subtler sociological scars. Although the armed conflict formally ended with the signing of the peace agreement, Bosnia and Herzegovina has, to this day, remained a site of a “frozen” conflict and persistent political instability.
During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb forces demolished 534 mosques, while Bosnian Croat forces destroyed 80. In addition, more than 700 properties owned by the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina were either demolished or devastated.[11]
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s cultural heritage also suffered severely during the war. In Sarajevo, both the National Library and the Oriental Institute were set on fire, destroying vast collections of manuscripts and archival materials.[10] In the territories seized by the Bosnian Serbs, mosques and other religious sites were systematically destroyed. During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian Serb forces demolished 534 mosques, while Bosnian Croat forces destroyed 80. In addition, more than 700 properties owned by the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina were either demolished or devastated.[11] The largest number of destroyed religious sites were located in those regions where the most severe crimes and acts of genocide were committed during 1992 and 1995, centered around Eastern Bosnia, including the towns of Višegrad, Zvornik, Bratunac, Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Foča, and Rogatica, as well as the Northwestern Bosnia, encompassing the towns of Prijedor, Banja Luka, Sanski Most, and Ključ. In the city of Banja Luka alone, 16 mosques were demolished. Among them were the Ferhadija and Arnaudija mosques, both listed as UNESCO-protected monuments.
After the war, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague, as well as courts in Bosnia and Herzegovina handed down numerous verdicts for war crimes and genocide, with the lion’s share levelled against the military and political leadership of the Bosnian Serbs and Croats. In light of the horrific human cost, however, the destruction of religious buildings and other historical monuments was largely relegated to the background. One of the rare examples in which the demolition of a mosque was explicitly addressed is the case of Predrag Kujundžić, who, together with his unit “Predini vukovi” within the so-called Army of the Republika Srpska, occupied a Muslim village in 1992 and demolished its mosque. For crimes committed in Doboj, Predrag Kujundžić was sentenced to 17 years in prison, with the sentence also covering the destruction of the mosque.[12] In 2018, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina brought an indictment against Goran Mojović, who in 1992 led the demolition of one of the most significant Bosniak mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Aladža Mosque in Foča. Mojović is one of many individuals indicted for crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina who are still hiding in the Republic of Serbia.[13]
In addition to religious sites, a significant number of religious officials were targeted during the war. According to data from the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 102 individuals associated with the work of the community were killed during the conflict.[14]
In addition to religious sites, a significant number of religious officials were targeted during the war. According to data from the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 102 individuals associated with the work of the community were killed during the conflict.[14] Particularly brutal was the killing of Imam Hasib Ramić near Sarajevo. Bosnian Serb forces first slaughtered his entire family, his wife and four children, the youngest of whom was only four months old, before ultimately killing Hasib Ramić himself.[15]
During the aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, a longer historical process gained speed, one that historiography refers to as de-Ottomanization. This process, originating in the nineteenth century, was marked by the systematic destruction of Muslim religious sites in nearly every war and conflict, and by the reduction of the territory inhabited by the Muslim population, with the objective or eradicating or removing from public space all that was connected to the Ottoman period and to Islam. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides just one example of this long-term process at play. During the war in Kosovo in 1999, a large number of Albanian mosques were destroyed. Likewise, the mosque of Niš, a city in Serbia, was deliberately damaged on several occasions in the twenty-first century.[16]
After the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a phase of restructuring and reorganization ensued. However, due to the complex functioning of its political system, the various compromises negotiated in the post-war period effectively resulted in the legalization of objectives that had been achieved through war and violence. Bosnia and Herzegovina was divided into two administrative units: the Republika Srpska, which politically came under Serb control, and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, composed of ten cantons, which was designated for Bosniaks and Croats. In addition, because of its strategic importance, the city of Brčko and its surrounding settlements were constituted as the so-called Brčko District, which essentially functions as a condominium of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, operating as a distinct self-governing area.[17]
The information presented here aims to concisely illustrate the complex administrative, organizational, and legal factors that post-war leaders encountered when attempting to rebuild a country devastated by war and, by extension, the challenges faced by those responsible for the reconstruction of religious sites. The matter was further complicated by the fact that most of the Muslim religious buildings destroyed during the war were located in the territory of Republika Srpska, where systematic efforts were undertaken to prevent the return of the displaced population.
The information presented here aims to concisely illustrate the complex administrative, organizational, and legal factors that post-war leaders encountered when attempting to rebuild a country devastated by war and, by extension, the challenges faced by those responsible for the reconstruction of religious sites. The matter was further complicated by the fact that most of the Muslim religious buildings destroyed during the war were located in the territory of Republika Srpska, where systematic efforts were undertaken to prevent the return of the displaced population. This was a key consideration of the Islamic Community of Bosnia and Herzegovina when prioritizing the reconstruction of war-destroyed religious sites. Thus, the guiding principle was that these sites should be rebuilt primarily by the returning population, which would serve as the foundation for the broader restoration of life for returnees in regions where crimes of ethnic cleansing and genocide had been committed.
In the entity of Republika Srpska, there remained cities that had played an important political, sociological and economic role during the Ottoman period. For example, Banja Luka served as the seat of the Bosnian Eyalet from 1580; Foča was the center of the Herzegovina Sanjak; Zvornik was the seat of the Zvornik Sanjak; and Višegrad functioned as a crossroads linking the Ottoman province of Bosnia with the rest of the Empire. Over the course of several centuries of Ottoman rule, these cities and surrounding towns saw the construction of numerous buildings of exceptional importance as cultural monuments and exemplary representations of Ottoman and Islamic architecture in Southeastern Europe.[18]
The process of reconstructing and renovating these sites progressed very slowly and continues to this day, further demonstrating the complexity and resistance surrounding such a project. One of the most telling cases was undoubtedly the reconstruction of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, the unofficial capital of Republika Srpska. The building permit for the mosque’s reconstruction was granted only in 2001. On the eve of the ceremonial groundbreaking, leaflets appeared bearing the inscription: “Tomorrow (Monday) our city will be attacked by Islamic hordes, aided by criminals from Austro-Hungary, who will once again attempt to sow the seeds of Islam in our city.”[19] The term “criminals from Austro-Hungary” was used to denote representatives of the European Union and the international community involved in the reconstruction process, primarily because their presence was expected to help calm the tense atmosphere. The local Serb population did not welcome this event as a step toward coexistence and normalization of relations but instead organized open resistance. Soon after, clashes erupted: around 4,000 citizens of Banja Luka attacked approximately 300 Muslims. Buses and cars used by the Muslims to travel to Banja Luka were set on fire. The gathered Serb crowd shouted “We do not want a mosque!” while the Muslim visitors, together with members of the diplomatic corps and the international community, sought refuge in a nearby building of the Islamic Community, which also came under attack.
Official responses came too little, too late. The then-Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, Mladen Ivanić, joined the besieged Muslims and representatives of the international community only several hours after the incidents had begun. A cordon of police eventually surrounded the building, dispersing the crowd that had been throwing stones and other objects at the premises of the Islamic Community. The situation was ultimately resolved when the police managed to secure the evacuation of the Muslims and international representatives. During the attack, Murat Badić from Cazin was killed, and 153 individuals were injured. To this day, Badić’s death remains an unresolved case. Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the Ferhadija Mosque was successfully completed in 2007, while the last mosque to be restored in Banja Luka was the Arnaudija Mosque, completed in 2024. The ceremonial openings of both mosques took place without unrest.
In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the situation was markedly different. The Bosniaks exercised significant influence in governance and politics, which allowed them to set the pace and shape the conditions for the reconstruction of mosques and other religious sites. The population was able to organize more quickly, and assistance flowed directly and easily, including from other Islamic countries such as Turkey, Iran, and various Arab states. The Bosnian diaspora, whose numbers had grown substantially during the war, also played a prominent role in reconstruction efforts. Mosques of considerable cultural and historical value were restored and rebuilt following the same principles as those applied to the aforementioned mosques in Republika Srpska, with the intention of making them appear as faithful as possible to their original form.
However, in certain municipalities, the construction of mosques also served as a means of transforming public space. An example can be found in the town of Ključ, a small municipality in western Bosnia. At the very beginning of the war, the Muslim population there suffered a series of horrific crimes, with several hundred civilians killed. The youngest victim, five-month-old Amila Džaferović, was shot in the head,[20] and nearly the entire population of 20,000 Muslims was expelled by the Serb army. In the final phase of the war, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina regained control over the municipality. As in all other municipalities where the Serb separatists had seized power, mosques and other Muslim religious sites were destroyed.[21] However, after the war, Muslim politicians and the local community did not rebuild the mosque on the site where it had previously stood, but instead destroyed a memorial park dedicated to the Yugoslavian socialist, anti-facist partisans of the Second World War and built the mosque on the park’s former grounds. Such a move came as part of a reinterpretation of the past by nationalist intellectuals that was rooted in a negative view of the region’s socialist legacy and, by extension, its monuments, and ultimately resulted in the demolition, neglect, or repurposing of such monuments. This represents one, though not the only, example showing how the process of reconstructing religious sites in areas where Bosniaks (Muslims) held political authority was shaped by efforts to adapt to new ideological frameworks, and the construct or reconstruct historical narratives in the idealogically tumultuous post-war period.
The reconstruction of destroyed Muslim religious sites is a process that has continued for thirty years and remains a charged issue to this day. Bosniaks in Republika Srpska are still subjected to threats and discrimination almost daily, which has undoubtedly contributed to negative trends regarding the return of Bosniaks and the completion of local restoration projects.
The reconstruction of destroyed Muslim religious sites is a process that has continued for thirty years and remains a charged issue to this day. Bosniaks in Republika Srpska are still subjected to threats and discrimination almost daily, which has undoubtedly contributed to negative trends regarding the return of Bosniaks and the completion of local restoration projects. On the other hand, in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the reconstruction of religious sites has been much easier to carry out and therefore has received less media attention, although it presents its own set of questions in which the restoration process is analyzed as a means of constructing new narratives and confronting the past.
Ajdin Muhedinović is a historian specializing in the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina during the 19th and 20th centuries. He obtained his master’s degree from the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Sarajevo in 2018, with a thesis on The Role of SUBNOR in Marking the People’s Liberation War during the 1970s. Currently, he is pursuing a Ph.D. at the same institution, focusing on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s history. His research primarily explores Bosnia and Herzegovina during the Second World War, with a particular emphasis on Bosniak history. His academic interests include Muslim politics during the war, the activities of Muslim organizations, and the social position of Muslim women in the first half of the 20th century. Additionally, he is engaged in studying the history of media and the culture of memory among Bosniaks.
Amer Maslo (University of Sarajevo – Oriental Institute) is a PhD student at the Department of History (Faculty of Philosophy, University of Sarajevo), specializing in 19th and 20th century history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. His research interest is primarily the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the South-East European region in the late Ottoman period, the perception of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and 20th centuries, the development of historical thought among Muslim intellectuals in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and history of historiography.
[1] Compare: Gale Stokes, The Walls Came Tumbling Down: The Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); James Mark et al. (ed.), 1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).
[2] Josip Broz Tito (1892-1980) was a communist and Yugoslav politician, as well as the lifelong president of Yugoslavia. See: Marie-Janine Calic, Tito: Der ewige Partisan (München: C.H. Beck-Verlag, 2020).
[3] Slobodan Milošević (1941-2006) was a Serbian politician and the leading political figure in Serbia at the end of the twentieth century. He died in 2006 in The Hague, where he was on trial for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. On Slobodan Milošević, see: Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2002); Nevenka Tromp, Prosecuting Slobodan Milošević. The Unfinished Trial (London: Routledge, 2016); Franjo Tuđman (1922-1999) was a Croatian politician and the leading political figure in Croatia during the same period in which Milošević dominated the Serbian political scene. On Franjo Tuđman, see: Marinko Čulić, Tuđman – i poslije Tuđmana (Zagreb: Znanje, 2014); Stevo Đurašković, “Nation-building in Franjo Tuđman’s Political Writings”, Politička misao: časopis za politologiju, 51 – 5 (2014), 58-79; On the events in Yugoslavia that led to its disintegration, including the activities of Milošević and Tuđman, see: Sabrina P. Ramet, The tree Yugoslavias: state-building and legitimation, 1918-2005 (Bloomington, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006); Dejan Jović, Yugoslavia: A State That Withered Away (West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 2009).
[4] According to the 1991 census, Bosnia and Herzegovina was home to 1,902,956 Muslims, 1,366,104 Serbs (predominantly Orthodox Christians), and 760,852 Croats (predominantly Catholics). Muslims referred to since 1993 as Bosniaks together with Serbs and Croats, were granted the status of constituent peoples in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 1995 peace agreement. On the 1991 census, see: http://fzs.ba/index.php/popis-stanovnistva/popis-stanovnistva-1991-i-stariji/ (pristupljeno, 7. avgusta 2025. godine).
[5] Voter turnout in the referendum was 64.31%, with 98.35% of voters in favor of an independent Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina largely boycotted the referendum. A map of the voting results is available at https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/referendum-bih-1992-rezultati-po-opstinama/32844063.html (accessed August 7, 2025). See also: Ajla Valjevac, Referendum građana Bosne i Hercegovine 1992: između prošlosti i budućnosti (Sarajevo: Fondacija Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2022).
[6] At the end of 1992, an armed conflict broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council. The conflict ended in 1994 but left lasting damage to Bosniak-Croat relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the wider region. The leaders of the Croatian Republic of Herzeg-Bosna were indicted for ethnic cleansing and participation in a joint criminal enterprise, and Croatia’s involvement in crimes committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina was confirmed. On the trial, see: https://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/acjug/en/171129-judgement-vol-1.pdf (accessed August 11, 2025).
[7] A list of judgments with summaries is available at https://www.icty.org/bcs/cases/spisak-presuda (accessed August 11, 2025); the text of the resolution establishing the International Day of Reflection and Commemoration of the Srebrenica Genocide is available at https://web.archive.org/web/20240610064910/https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/152/96/pdf/n2415296.pdf?token=KrmHZx0rvjFMGv7T5c&fe=true (accessed August 19, 2025).
[8] Urteil Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf IV – 26/96 2 StE 8/69 Generalbundesanwalt gegen In der Strafsache Nikola Jorgić. https://www.asser.nl/upload/documents/20120611T032446-Jorgic_Urteil_26-9-1997.pdf (accessed August 19, 2025).
[9] See: https://www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/0/126173.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com (accessed August 19, 2025).
[10] See: András Riedlmayer, “Convivencia under Fire: Genocide and Book-burning in Bosnia”, in: The Holocaust and the Book: Destruction and Preservation, ur. Jonathan Rose, University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst 2001, 266-291; András Riedlmayer, “From the Ashes: The Past and Future of Bosnia’s cultural Heritage”, in: Islam and Bosnia: Conflict Resolution and Foreign Policy in Multi-Ethnic States, ur. Maya Shatzmiller, McGill-Queens University Press, Montreal 2002, 98-135.
[11] Before the war, there were 1,144 mosques in Bosnia and Herzegovina, meaning that more than half of them were destroyed during the conflict. Muharem Omerdić, Prilozi izučavanju genocida nad Bošnjacima (1992-1995) (Sarajevo: El-Kalem, 1999), 476.
[12] On the trial and verdict of Petar Kujundžić, see: https://www.sudbih.gov.ba/Court/Case/55 (accessed August 21, 2025).
[13] https://sudbih.gov.ba/Post/Read/21002-potvrdjena-optuznica-u-predmetu-goran-mojovic (accessed August 21, 2025).
[14] Muharem Omerdić, “Sudbina imama u proteklom ratu u Bosni i Hercegovini”, Novi Muallim, 8 – 30(2007), 21.
[15] https://medzlis-sarajevo.ba/sjecanja-sest-porodicnih-kabura-hasib-ef-ramica-za-opomenu/ (accessed August 25, 2025).
[16] https://balkans.aljazeera.net/news/balkan/2016/3/9/rijaset-izs-osudio-skrnavljenje-niske-dzamije (accessed August 25, 2025).
[17] Compare with note IX.
[18] This includes, above all, the Ferhadija Mosque (1579) and the Arnaudija Mosque (1595) in Banja Luka, the Aladža Mosque (1549) in Foča, and the Zamlaz Mosque in Zvornik (16th century).
[19] https://vreme.com/vreme/sest-sati-horora/ (accessed August 25, 2025).
[20] See: https://balkans.aljazeera.net/teme/2018/7/8/beba-amila-les-broj-172 (accessed September 4, 2025).
[21] Ermin Vučkić and Mujo Begić, “Uništavanje džamija i drugih objekata Islamske zajednice Bosne i Hercegovine na području općine Ključ”, Zbornik radova Islamskog pedagoškog fakulteta u Bihaću, IX (2019), 277-300.