Muslims form a substantial voting bloc in Uttar Pradesh (UP), India’s most populous and influential state. Politics in the state are fiercely competitive and relatively fair. Muslims make up a fifth of the UP’s voters, making them a prominent and influential group in the state where the winning party rarely receives more than forty percent of the popular vote. Muslim politics in Uttar Pradesh presents the paradox of a sizable minority failing to stem systemic social disadvantage by exerting political power.
“Rather than uniting their vote to extract greater concessions from the state, UP Muslims have been dividing their vote since the mid-90s according to intra-Muslim diversity, caste-identities, and economic class.”
One cause of this paradox may be that Muslims fail to vote together. Rather than uniting their vote to extract greater concessions from the state, UP Muslims have been dividing their vote since the mid-90s according to intra-Muslim diversity, caste-identities, and economic class. The recent landslide victory of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) reveals the cost for Muslims of failing to effectively leverage their numbers for political influence. The BJP nominated no Muslims to the legislative assembly and appointed a Chief Minister with a history of inflammatory anti-Muslim rhetoric to rule the state. Disunity at the polls may indicate the community’s long-term, future socio-economic disadvantage as UP Muslims forego political power by scattering their vote.
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh
Uttar Pradesh has a population of over 200 million, with Muslims numbering over 40 million; there are more Muslims in the state than in the Levant. The 2006 Sachar Committee Report commissioned by the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh reveals that this demographic group suffers from dramatically poorer social development outcomes than the average UP citizen. The report found that Muslims are 18 percent less literate than UP’s Hindus, and 83 percent more likely to be counted among urban poor.
Poorer access to state resources contributes to higher poverty, illiteracy, and inequality. The average Muslim child in UP receives only 2.6 years of schooling, versus the state average of 3.4 years. Further, Muslim children are significantly less likely to receive a state-sponsored “Mid-day Meal.” Muslims make up only 5.1 percent of state employees, despite their much larger share of the state’s overall population. These data indicate collective hardship for the state’s Muslims.
“Muslims make up only 5.1 percent of state employees, despite their much larger share of the state’s overall population.”
Despite strong evidence of collective discrimination, UP’s Muslims have been increasingly choosing to vote separately in UP’s fiercely competitive elections as shown in Figure-1. Since the Indian National Congress (“Congress”) lost its hold over the state in 1989, three parties have dominated UP politics; the Samajwadi Party (SP) or Socialist Party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) or the Majority People’s Party, and the BJP. The SP is a regional party and has been led by Mulayam Singh Yadav since its founding in 1992 and draws its core support from the Yadav caste, whose members are concentrated in Northwest India and are considered disadvanged in many states. The BSP is India’s most popular pro-Dalit political party, advocating for low-caste Hindus. It’s leader, Kumari Mayawati is India’s most prominent Dalit leader. The BJP is a national party, and part of the Sangh Parivar group of Hindu-nationalist organizations which are active across the country.
The most popular party for Muslims over the past 25 years has been the SP since Mulayam Singh ordered security forces to fire on Hindu nationalist protestors seeking to demolish the ancient Babri Masjid as chief minister. A generation of Muslims offered Singh their vote in exchange for the promise of security. However, anti-Muslim violence has subsided since the early 90s, and Muslim support for the SP has also been degrading.
“The most popular party for Muslims over the past 25 years has been the SP…”
The SP’s main rival for the Muslim vote has been the BSP; the Party’s leader, Mayawati has argued that Muslims share many of the socio-economic ills as low-caste communities, making her their best advocate. This argument has worked for many, and the party now enjoys a sizeable support base of Muslim voters. Congress is the second party which prominently contends for the Muslim vote and does better in this community during national Lok Sobha elections. However, Congress ruled India under the leadership of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in 1992 when the Babri Masjid was demolished, and the party’s inability to protect the mosque or Muslim lives during subsequent communal riots severely tarnished its reputation among UP’s Muslims.
By subtracting the Muslim vote share of the most popular party by that of the second-most popular party, we can observe trends in the community’s electoral solidarity. Figure-2 shows the average results of this vote-dispersion metric over periods encompassing three elections. Muslim electoral solidarity has fallen significantly since the mid-90s.
Intra-Muslim Division
One reason for the dramatic fall in Muslim electoral solidarity since the mid-90s may be that Muslims are voting according to intra-Muslim divisions. Muslims in UP make up a diverse demographic group, holding sectarian and intra-sect identities. And it is these competing identities that may partly explain the fall in Muslim electoral solidarity. Although reliable data, or how they vote, is unavailable, these groups have politically active segments whose decisions indicate which way their followers are voting. By studying which parties these groups endorse, we may observe trends in Muslim voting behavior which can help explain division within Muslim voting.
UP’s Muslims subscribe to both the Sunni and Shi‘i sects of Islam, and both these groups compete politically. Although Sunnis form a majority, different religious movements which advocate varying legal interpretations and forms of practice divide them. The most prominent of these are the Deobandi and Barelvi movements. Muslim religious leadership has pulled UP Muslims in different directions, with prominent leaders implicitly or overtly supporting the SP, BSP, Congress, and the BJP.
“Muslim religious leadership has pulled UP Muslims in different directions, with prominent leaders implicitly or overtly supporting the SP, BSP, Congress, and the BJP.”
UP’s Shi‘a have long argued that Sunnis received an excessive level of patronage and access to power. The most prominent Shi‘i political leader in the state, Maulana Kalbe Jawad, and his organization, the Majlis-e-Ulema-e-Hind, have sometimes supported the BJP or simply opposed the incumbent in various elections across India. In recent years, Jawad has been adamantly anti-SP, and has supported the BSP and the BJP.
Among Sunnis, Deobandis are arguably the most organized religious group. The leadership of the Deobandi movement centers around its founding seminary in Deoband, Darul Uloom Deoband (Deoband). In past elections, Deoband’s leadership have often implicitly supported the SP by inviting Mulayam Singh for well-publicized visits to the institution. Mulayam Singh has in turn publically supported the seminary’s sometimes controversial fatwas.[1] The popular political movement founded and run by graduates of Deobandi institutions, Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind, began supporting Singh after Babri Masjid incident, but have also periodically thrown their weight behind Congress.[2]
The descendants of Sheikh Ahmed Raza Khan, the founder of the Barelvi movement, hold significant influence among its followers. Maulana Taueqeer Raza Khan, Ahmed Khan’s most politically active great-grandson, floated his own political party in 2012, earning over 190,000 votes and one state assembly seat. Khan is a political chameleon, urging his followers to support Congress in 2009, and the BSP in 2014. The All India Ulama and Mashaikh Board is another prominent Barelvi-aligned Muslim political group, and it has a history of supporting the BSP.
Muslims and Caste
Caste plays a huge role in Indian politics, and this identity may also influence the Muslim vote. Assigning caste to Muslims is complex because Islam does not recognize caste identities. However, the 1980 Mandal Commission found 82 Other-Backward Caste (OBC) groups among Muslims in India. According to the Commission, most Muslims in Uttar Pradesh belong to an OBC group. Starting in 1995 the UP government began issuing caste-certificates to Muslims belonging to OBC groups to allow them to take advantage of caste-based affirmative action programs.
“Caste plays a huge role in Indian politics, and this identity may also influence the Muslim vote.”
One way to ascertain how OBC Muslims are voting is through the decisions of their interest groups. In 2010, OBC Muslims launched the Pasmanda Muslim Samaj organization in UP. The world “Pasmanda” comes from Persian, and means, “those who have fallen behind.” The group supported the SP in 2012, and in 2017 two founders of the group joined the BSP. One motivation for Pasmanda Muslims to organize for greater representation may be due to the discrimination they face in the Muslim community.
The BSP presents itself as the champion of backward caste Indians and the party has attempted to woo backward caste Muslims. The party has utilized the slogan, “Dalit-Muslim pichda ek saman, Hindu ho ya Musalman” (All Dalits and backward castes are alike, Hindu or Muslim) to attract backward caste Muslims. However, polling data shown in Table 2 reveals that Muslim OBCs supported the SP over the BSP to a significant degree. This data reveals that Muslim OBCs are far less likely to support the Congress party and BJP than other Muslims. These parties are more popular among high-caste Hindus, and that trend seems to hold among high-caste Muslims as well.
Table 1: Muslim OBC Voting Pattern in the 2009 Lok Sobha Elections
| Congress | BJP | BSP | SP | Others | |
| Muslim OBCs | 20.2% | 3.1% | 19.8% | 32.2% | 24.8% |
| Other Muslims | 37.3% | 6.0% | 23.2% | 21.9% | 11.6 |
Source: CSDS
Economic Class
UP’s main political parties present different economic agendas, and these agendas may appeal to Muslims of various economic classes differently. The BJP has shown itself as the party of economic liberalism, promising to create a more business-friendly environment in India. The SP and the BSP, in contrast, present themselves as leftist and socialist, appealing to the strong socialist tradition in India championed by the Congress Party after Independence.
“In choosing between the SP and BSP, data indicates that that wealthier Muslims may prefer the SP over the BSP.”Muslims of different economic classes appear to be voting differently, but these differences do not clearly reflect the differences in party platforms. Wealthier Muslims may be increasingly voting for the BJP despite the party’s anti-Muslim reputation. Scholar E. Sridharan argues that middle and upper-class Muslims in UP are increasingly voting for the BJP.
“It is surprising that lower class Muslims are nearly four times more likely to vote for the BJP than upper-class Muslims.”In choosing between the SP and BSP, data indicates that that wealthier Muslims may prefer the SP over the BSP. Data collected by the CSDS shown in Table 2 reveals that wealthier Muslims prefer the SP, while poor Muslims are much more likely to support Congress. It is surprising that lower class Muslims are nearly four times more likely to vote for the BJP than upper-class Muslims. This paradox indicates that class-based voting may have more to do with social networks than parties’ economic policies.
Table 2: Muslim Voting Pattern in the 2009 Lok Sobha Elections According to Economic Class
| Congress | BJP | BSP | SP | Others | |
| Upper | 13.8% | 2.6% | 28.4% | 28.4% | 26.7% |
| Middle | 26.7% | 4.8% | 19.2% | 31.5% | 17.8% |
| Lower | 32.9% | 8.1% | 15.4% | 23.5% | 20.1% |
| Poor | 42.5% | 2.3% | 25.3% | 24.1% | 5.7% |
Source: CSDS[3]
Conclusion
Muslims have offered a much more unified voting bloc in Hyderabad and Kerala where they have floated successful political parties. In these locations, Muslims leveraged their size to have a highly influential role in competitive coalition politics. Thus far, UP Muslims have failed to follow the lead of their co-religionists in these parts of India.
“Intra-Muslim division, caste-identities, and economic class all contribute to determining how UP Muslims vote.”
Intra-Muslim division, caste-identities, and economic class all contribute to determining how UP Muslims vote. Political leaders representing intra-Muslim groups have pulled the community in different directions. Some Muslim OBCs have launched their own political organization, and Muslims OBCs vote differently from other Muslims. Also, poor Muslims seem far more likely to support Congress as opposed to wealthier Muslims, who are more likely to support the SP.
The dramatic decline in Muslim electoral solidarity since the 1990s is likely due to a positive development: the community feels safer. After the demolition of the Babri Masjid, UP Muslims felt threatened by growing Hindu nationalism and turned to the Mulayam Singh as a protector. However, although communal riots continue to occasionally flare up in the state, UP Muslims feel far safer than they once did.
“The dramatic decline in Muslim electoral solidarity since the 1990s is likely due to a positive development: the community feels safer.”Without the effect of fear to bind the Muslim vote, Muslims seem to be increasingly voting like average Indians—along with the social network they most identify with, whether this is caste, economic class, or religious organization.
[1] Seminary’s ruling gets Mulayam’s support. (2005, Jun 30). The Times of India (1861-Current) Retrieved from https://search-proquest-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/docview/ 1516251440?accountid=11752
[2] The Times of India,News Service. “Jamiat Asks Muslims to Support Cong.” The Times of India (1861-Current), Jul 31, 1999. https://search-proquest-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/docview/615828920?accountid=11752.
[3] Mirza A. Beg, “2014 Lok Sobha Elections: BJP All The Way in Uttar Pradesh,” Research Journal Social Sciences 22, no. 2 (2014).