The positivistic attitude brought forth by modernity, insofar as its insistence on perpetuating a reductionistic epistemological model founded on empiricism and materialism is concerned, contradicts the Islāmic viewpoint not only in terms of its metaphysics, but permeates the loci of thoughts and comprehension. The locus of cognition, in all senses, is the heart, which comprises a litany of layers that cognize different aspects of reality, from the material to the metaphysical, and the rational to the supra-rational. The dualism modernity promotes—one wherein the two components may never be combined harmoniously—strips matter and spirit apart, leaving everything to a matter of the physical self with no spiritual significance. It has, in turn, been in part responsible for climate change, for man has, rather than the viceregent he was meant to be over nature, exploited it for his own needs without giving it its due rights; the hyper-individualism promoted thereby has collapsed family structures, leading to negative changes visible across communities as a whole; and it has, most importantly, stripped man apart of his very nature, forcing upon him a persona he was never meant to assume.
“The locus of cognition, in all senses, is the heart, which comprises a litany of layers that cognize different aspects of reality, from the material to the metaphysical, and the rational to the supra-rational. The dualism modernity promotes—one wherein the two components may never be combined harmoniously—strips matter and spirit apart, leaving everything to a matter of the physical self with no spiritual significance.”
There are differences of opinion regarding the root from which the Arabic term for man—insān—stems. One group argues that it stems from the root anas: to be amicable and loving of companionship; the latter proposes that it stems from nasiya, meaning, to forget. Both are intimate parts of man’s nature and shed light on unique facets. Man is, by nature, a social creature who may not be divorced from society and others. Man had undertaken his Covenant with Allāh ﷻ individually, but that all of mankind was subject thereto shows the presence of a greater collective, therefore illuminating the distinction between personal obligations (al-furūḍ al-ʿayn) and communal obligations (al-furūḍ al-kifāyah). When a concept of hyper-individualism is imposed, man finds himself detached from what his soul demands of him, though his soul is only complete with the love it finds in others and, most importantly and ultimately, in Allāh ﷻ. The second root, on the other hand, displays man’s forgetful nature. We shall avoid delving further given that the former is more pertinent to our discussion.
The dualism promoted by modernity contrasts with its Islāmic counterpart in that man is both, from our perspective, body and spirit, and the contemplation of the realities that correspond to each—material and metaphysical—all find their locus in the heart, of which the mind is but a mere component. Thus, the cognition of spiritual realities is not divorced, in this perception, from the cognition of material ones, and “is also within the province of reason and is not necessarily divorced from a rational understanding of them.”
Existences from the Islāmic framework fall into any of five categories, and these are then tied to the various Planes of Existence as elaborated upon in Shaykh al-Akbar Muḥyī al-Dīn Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphysics. The first, the ḥaqīqī, represents the objective, ontological reality of a certain object, and this is intimately tied to the essence of the object. Relevant here is the distinction between the ḥaqq and the ḥaqīqah of a certain thing, wherein the ḥaqīqah denotes its ontological nature, or what it truly is. The ḥaqq, on the other hand, has two aspects, one pertaining to the reality of what it is in reference to, and the other to certain modes or aspects relevant thereto. In simpler terms, a proposition regarding some accidental property of an object—say, its color—would denote a ḥaqq, if true, whereas the very essence of the object would denote its ḥaqīqah. While the former may be discovered by generic epistemic means, via the senses, intellect, or reports, the same may not be said for the ontological reality, for as Ibn Sīnā writes, such means only lead to lower forms of cognition, given that we may only perceive accidents. As he indicates, the purpose of philosophy or conceptual thought is to arrive at the reality of things, insofar as it is possible for man to do so. Later in his Ishārāt, he qualifies this assertion, writing that man himself cannot grasp the realities of things. Of things, we may only know their properties, connections, and accidents, but not what makes them different, for differences are what define things and set them apart from other existences. This is somewhat in contrast to the Platonist perception, as the latter has a particular focus on henology—on unity and a unifying principle—although it does not disregard differentia and multiplicity in any sense, as “it is due to the distinctness inherent in each Divine Attribute that a reality from among the infinite realities of the Divine Names becomes manifest.” Thus, it is only natural for differences to exist, though for them to be comprehensible, they must be subordinated to a unifying substratum. If all differentiations are denied—internal and external—being loses its intelligibility and thus ceases to be anything. The essence of a thing lies in its difference, but should we treat things as collections of different manifolds, we will be left with an infinite number of differences and will not find anything coherent, as there must be a unifying substratum to which these differences are subjected. Plato and Plotinus, thus, argue that being must somehow include determination, and therefore sameness as well as otherness, in order to be intelligible and so to be being, as Eric Perl elucidates. An arbitrary combination of properties could never be a tree unless the properties, including the height, color, width, and such, were all subordinated to a ‘tree’ as their unifying principle, such that numerous realities like genus, difference, and species must all be realized under one singular (fard), as Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī indicates.
For Ibn ʿArabī, a similar reasoning carries on to Allāh ﷻ as well, for we must not think of Him ﷻ only in terms of transcendence but also in terms of union, as transcendence is merely one of the two basic aspects of the Absolute. All knowledge of Allāh ﷻ otherwise remains one-sided such that it does not unite transcendence and immanence. Similarly, Al-Aṭṭās indicates that objects have a physical reality, consisting of substances and accidents, and a metaphysical reality that is not perceptible through the mere senses. Our lower forms of reasoning can only draw conclusions regarding the material natures of things, but it is the unveiling of the heart that is required to perceive their true ontological natures, and this holds true especially in the case of the Divine, although His Essence is incomprehensible even in the highest stages of unveiling (kashf).
The second form, sensible (ḥissī), is confined to the faculties of sense and sensible experience, including dreams, visions, and illusions. The third, imaginary (khayālī), comprises objects of sensible existence in the imagination when they are momentarily absent from human perception. The fourth, intellectual (ʿaqlī), consists of abstract concepts in the human mind. The fifth and final level consists of those which do not exist in any of the other levels but resemble them in some manner. There is a level, in the Islāmic epistemic framework, that is supra-rational in nature and transcends these levels, experienced only by Prophets and Saints. It is at this level that the realities of things (ḥaqāʾiq al-ashyāʾ) are apprehended.
In Ibn ʿArabī’s metaphysical view, existences all fall into one of five levels (marātib), all interconnected in one form or another to the aforementioned forms of existence, representing an ontological mode of the absolute Reality in its self-manifestation. While Ibn ʿArabī himself does not lay out such a categorization, a simple sketch of his conception may be provided based on the writings of Qāshānī and others:
- The plane of the Essence (al-dhāt), the world of the absolute non-manifestation (al-ghayb al-muṭlaq), or the Mystery of Mysteries.
- The plane of the Attributes and Names, the Presence of Divinity (ulūhīyah).
- The plane of the Actions, the Presence of Lordship (rubūbīyah).
- The plane of Images (amthāl) and Imagination (khayāl).
- The plane of the senses and sensible experience (mushāhadah).
Each plane below is an image of that above, being ontologically subservient thereto and less real. The plane of senses and sensible experiences, thus, according to Qāshānī, is an image of the plane of Images, which is, in turn, a reflection of the plane of Actions, which is then an image of the Divine Names and Attributes (al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt), all of which ultimately subsist in the Divine Essence (al-dhāt al-ilāhiyyah). Ascending them leads to unification (waḥdah), while with descent one witnesses multiplicity (kathrah), as those above grant unifying substrata for those below.
In the words of Nasr, “The lower is less real than the higher, which is veiled from it. The higher contains all that is positively real in the lower, but the lower does not possess the same degree of being or the same level of reality and perfection as the higher.” The layers above, in other terms, are ontologically superior to those below, for if a reality differs from another “by being more powerful (aqwā), prior (aqdam), stronger (ashadd), or superior (awlā) in something, all of that is due, in the opinion of the verifier, to its manifestation (al-ẓuhūr) rather than to any multiplicity occurring in the reality [itself] which is becoming manifest.” While the case is similar to both the Aristotelian and Platonist conceptions of causation in that the cause must be ontologically superior to what is caused, as the effect may not possess what the cause may not give rise to, the planes are not necessarily causes as much as they are substrata. As the ladder is ascended, the Supreme Being reveals (yatajallā) itself in an increasingly greater manner, the greatest of which occurs in the Plane of the Divine Attributes, as the plane of the Divine Essence—the substratum within which the Attributes subsist—is the locus of non-manifestation. All of these planes subsist and ultimately unite in the Essence, and this in effect is the doctrine of the Unity of Existence (waḥdat al-wujūd).
Ibn ʿArabī writes, “All possibilities (mumkināt) are principally reducible to nonexistence (ʿudum) and there is no Being (or, Existence) other than the Being of Allāh, may He be exalted, (revealing Himself) in the ‘forms’ of the states which result from possibilities as they are in themselves in their essential determinations.” ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī elaborates, “Know that from one of the utterly mistaken vindications from the laypeople amongst the believers regarding the gnostics (ahl al-ʿārifīn) is their saying that Allāh ﷻ is the true existence. The meaning of this statement is that it is Allāh ﷻ through Whom existents (al-mawjūdāt) are sustained.” He draws a distinction here between the reality of waḥdat al-wujūd as is held by the Sunnīs and the view commonly ascribed to Akbarians in the form of pantheism, denouncing the latter, and affirming it to mean that Allāh ﷻ is the Sole Sustainer of all existences—not that He ﷻ is within them.
What permeates our understanding of reality, alongside unity, is dualism, concerning the soul or our dual natures as body and spirit. Allāh ﷻ said, according to the wording of an oft-cited ḥadīth qudsī, “I was a Hidden Treasure and I loved to be known, so I created the Creation so that I might be known.” The Ultimate Reality possesses two aspects: the interior, self-concealing (bāṭin) aspect, and its outward, self-revealing (ẓāhir) counterpart wherein the inclination toward self-manifestation is initiated by desiring to be known. He ﷻ manifests Himself ﷻ in and to both the seen (ʿālam al-shahādah) and the unseen realms (ʿālam al-ghayb), with the lowest level thereof occurring in the phenomenal world. As the ladder is ascended, conversely, the plane of absolute non-manifestation is approached, wherein none save for the Divine Essence may contemplate Himself ﷻ; nor may the Essence be qualified (taqyīd) even by Absoluteness, for absoluteness, being a qualification, is a restriction. It is in this sense that the Platonists assert that Allāh ﷻ is beyond Being.
A shadow of the Plane of Images, the phenomenal world is the final degree of succession from the levels of existence through which the ultimate Reality—the One True Existence—reveals Himself. The world of Images (ʿālam al-mithāl) is ontologically an intermediate domain between the purely sensible and the purely spiritual, between “fineness” and “coarseness.” Occasionally, the ʿālam al-mithāl appears as it really is, typically in the form of a veridical dream, as they are symbols indicating higher realities. These, in turn, are cognized by not the mind which perceives accidents and is unable to approach essential realities, but rather the inner levels of the heart which comprise different layers, each absorbing reality in its different levels of manifestation. Burckhardt sums, “Exotericism stands on the level of formal intelligence which is conditioned by its objects, which are partial and mutually exclusive truths. As for esotericism, it realizes that intelligence which is beyond forms and it alone moves freely in its limitless space and sees how relative truths are delimited.” This aspect will be discussed in greater detail shortly.
Each plane has an interior aspect that ties in with the exterior aspect of the plane above, and an exterior that ties into the interior of the one below. The first, the plane of the Essence, is the plane from which all the others fundamentally stem. The second is the stage of General Existence, wherein Allāh ﷻ is identified in His ﷻ self-revealing aspect, and this connects to the exterior aspect of the first plane, the interior aspect encompassing the second degree of existence as it unfolds itself in initial manifestation; it is the manifestation of the Essence to Itself, therefore constituting the first emanation. The third constitutes the plane of Relative Existence, wherein the Ultimate Reality is conditioned by the Divine Names and Attributes, the exterior of which constitutes the interior aspect of the following plane: the Immutable Archetypes (aʿyān al-thābita). As Images of the Divine Names, they are infinite and immutable entities fixed in Allāh’s ﷻ Knowledge; in other words, they constitute the fixed entities and essences of contingent things, not in extramental reality, in pre-existence. Ibn ʿArabī formulated this thesis to counteract the argument of the falāsifa that Allāh ﷻ is merely aware of universals and not particulars, as particular changes would imply additions to Allāh ﷻ’s Knowledge—this is impossible as it would imply an imperfection therein.
Ibn ʿArabī formulated this thesis to counteract the argument of the falāsifa that Allāh ﷻ is merely aware of universals and not particulars, as particular changes would imply additions to Allāh ﷻ’s Knowledge—this is impossible as it would imply an imperfection therein.
He responded that since changes in creation must be counterbalanced by what is immutable in Allāh’s ﷻ knowledge, there must be immutable entities in Allāh’s ﷻ knowledge that serve as ‘blueprints’ or ‘fixed essences’ that particular occurrences and things must map onto, hence their immutability. The sole light a rainbow possesses, for instance, is in essence responsible for the multitude of colors that stem forth. The multiplicity, however, does not negate the unity or oneness of the light itself, and such is the case with the aʿyān al-thābita and the multifarious manifestations of things and their variegations in the corporeal world. Allāh ﷻ knows things as they are, but it is in the lower planes of existence that general knowledge is obtained as the Archetypes unfold are things are particularized to us. The litany of possibilities and changes does not negate the unicity of Divine Knowledge. Allāh ﷻ perceives things in all their possible states and their variegations and brings particular possibilities into existence to unveil to man himself his actions, for while Allāh ﷻ witnesses all possibilities and is aware of them, man is not. ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī elaborates,
If the entire world [already] exists in the knowledge of the Real, what could the world have gained from appearing as the visible world (ʿālam al-shahāda)? The answer is, as the Shaykh [Ibn ʿArabī] said in the seventeenth chapter of the Futūḥāt, that through its having appeared as the observed world, the world gained knowledge of itself that it did not have before, not that it gained an [essential] state it did not have before [in God’s knowledge] … the Real perceives all possible beings both in their states of non-existence and existence, as well as the variegations of their states, but possible beings [in the knowledge of God] do not perceive themselves, nor their existence, nor the variegations of their states. When the vision of their own selves was unveiled for them, they perceived in their imaginal faculties the variegations of their own states. Thus, God only brought particularized essences (al-aʿyān) into existence in order to unveil to them, stage by stage, their [own] essences and states in succession, one after the other. This is the meaning of our saying ‘He derives no new knowledge from the [appearance] of new beings, because they are all [already] known to the Real.’
The Platonic Forms, or the aʿyān, if we are to draw similarities, cannot be “models” in this sense which particular existences must map on to. If there is a coin, for example, that serves as a ‘form’ in accordance with this paradigmatic interpretation, then producing 23 more coins would lead to a total of 24. It is this misinterpretation that leads to the ‘third-man’ argument, although just as the intelligible ‘look’ that is common to many things of the same kind, a form is not an additional thing of that kind. A body is not a copy—a physical, sensible thing, of an intelligible idea. The forms, as such, are not replicas, and nor are the images of these forms such, but it is rather that the forms are the intelligible patterns that appear in the structures of things by virtue of which they are what they are. ‘Separation,’ then, is simply a term for the ontological distinction between the intelligible entities and the objects of sensible experience. Forms are transcendent in that as intelligible entities, they are distinct from the instances they inform. There is no contradiction, thus, between transcendence and immanence, as shall be further clarified in due course.
From the aʿyān stem the exterior archetypes, which are in fact images of the aʿyān al-thābita which correspond to the Plane of Images, being succeeded by the phenomenal world itself. The planes, therefore, are effectively levels of renewal and self-manifestation, given that the lower levels yielding multiplicity are individuations (taʿayyun) of the states contained in the aʿyān al-thābita. The following diagrams from al-Aṭṭās’s Prolegomena may elucidate the concepts further.
These layers are, in some form, connected to the layers of the heart, since it is within man these manifestations find a uniform locus. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, regarding the different terms employed therefor in the Qurʾān—ṣadr, qalb, fuʾād, and lubb—writes, “Know, may Allāh ﷻ increase you in understanding of the dīn, that the qalb is a name that comprises all the inner stations [of the heart].” The ṣadr, the outermost layer, “is the dominion of the evil-inclined soul (nafs al-ammārah bi-l-sūʾ), due to which it is inclined to assumptions, pride, and being swayed away by its own self.” It is the locus of the light of Islām which retains what is heard (masmūʿ), or, in other words, the exoteric forms of speech.
Inside the ṣadr lies the qalb, “the locus of the light of belief (īmān), calm, attentive humility (khushūʿ), fear of Allāh ﷻ (taqwā), love (maḥabbah), contentment (riḍā), certainty (yaqīn), fear (khawf), hope (rajāʾ), patience (ṣabr), and conviction (qināʿah).” As it is linguistically the nature of the qalb to waver, all of what the qalb is the locus of is subject to change, including īmān itself, as per the ḥadīth that it increases and decreases.
The fuʾād, the locus of cognition (maʿrifah), thoughts (khawāṭir), and dreams (ruʾya), lies inside the qalb. When a man attains gnosis (maʿrifah) or benefits in terms of knowledge—particularly the esoteric (bāṭīnī) facets thereof—it is the fuʾād that benefits first, followed by the qalb, and then the ṣadr. The fourth and innermost layer, the lubb, is the layer in which all the outer layers subsist. As the unifying stage of the heart and its greatest Sulṭān, it is what houses the light of absolute tawḥīd.
Man is the microcosmic representation (ʿālam al-ṣaghīr) of the macrocosmos (ʿālam al-kabīr) in this phenomenal, corporeal world (ʿālam al-ajsām) which itself is a theater of manifestation (maẓhar) of the Divine Names.
Man is the microcosmic representation (ʿālam al-ṣaghīr) of the macrocosmos (ʿālam al-kabīr) in this phenomenal, corporeal world (ʿālam al-ajsām) which itself is a theater of manifestation (maẓhar) of the Divine Names. Allāh ﷻ created man in His image, and as such the Divine Attributes, on a microcosmic level, are manifested within him. Since man is at once both body and spirit, his soul governs his body as Allāh ﷻ governs the Universe. This soul in turn has two aspects analogous to his dual nature: his rational soul (nafs al-nāṭiqah) and animal soul (nafs al-ḥayawāniyyah). It is man’s duty to subjugate his carnal self and allow its rational counterpart to dominate, thus in effect producing liberation, for freedom is not defined by the ability to commit any arbitrary action at will, but to act in accordance with what our true nature dictates, and it dictates that which is good. It is in this context that Ibn ʿArabī and Ṣūfīs generally cite the maxim attributed to the Prophet ﷺ: “He who knows himself knows his Lord.” The man who knows himself is aware of his weaknesses and thus knows how he must refine himself so as to attain maʿrifah. At the highest levels of self-realization, knowledge of one’s self yields the recognition that there is nothing in existence save for the self, for there is nothing to be found in the universe that is not in one form or another Allāh’s ﷻ self-disclosure.
Man must manifest the attributes within himself justly, as every attribute may have both a just and an unjust manifestation, insofar as justice pertains to the placement of a thing in its proper place. A man unjustly taking the life of another is a manifestation of Allāh’s ﷻ Name al-Ḍarr (The Punisher/Harmer), but so is punishing the transgressor. While both are in effect punishments, the core difference here is that the latter is, unlike the former, just. The just manifestations of these attributes and their refinement allow him to bring forth the Perfect Man (al-insān al-kāmil), each layer of whose heart has connections with the Akbarian Planes, both in their internal and external forms.
The ṣadr is connected to the phenomenal world and the Plane of Images, as the former is not only a collection of objects and things containing external existence (al-wujūd al-khārijī) but rife with symbols, since it is the final level of expansion (al-inbisāṭ) from which nominal relations with regard to the Divine Essence are realized. The qalb is connected to the interior layer of the Plane of Images and the exterior of the Plane of Actions, comprising the aʿyān al-thābita. As words pass through the ṣadr, the locus of memorization or retainment (ḥifẓ), they pass through the qalb, and this is where man finds himself wavering, as is the nature of the qalb, between the meanings of the symbols. The symbols then enter the fuʾād which, connected to the external layer of the Plane of the Divine Names and the internal layer of the Plane of Images, interprets them. The kernel, then, is the lubb, which is connected to the exterior layer of the Plane of the Essence and the interior of the Plane of the asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt, and man may progress no further due to the incomprehensibility of the Divine Essence.
As is the case within man and outside of his own self, a significant case of dualism arises in Akbarian Metaphysics as it pertains to man’s relationship with Allāh ﷻ.
As is the case within man and outside of his own self, a significant case of dualism arises in Akbarian Metaphysics as it pertains to man’s relationship with Allāh ﷻ. As explained by Ibn ʿArabī, His ﷻ Transcendence (tanzīh) and Immanence (tashbīh) and relation to the world must be simultaneously affirmed, for if any relationship is to be established with the Divine and if aspects of His ﷻ manifestations may be understood, analogous cases must be formed as similarities are negated, for a negative theological approach—one based on knowing Allāh ﷻ based on negations and differences only—renders Him ﷻ an abstract being with no connection to man whatsoever. This balance is what Muḥyī al-Dīn repeatedly emphasizes throughout his works, for it is what cultivates the ‘Eye of the Heart’ (ʿayn al-baṣīrah) and allows for maʿrifah. Only the ignorant, he challenged, view Allāh ﷻ in terms of absolute tanzīh. But if such a relationship is to be established, then it is the heart that must be cultivated.
It is on this note that Ibn al-Qayyim writes that the meanings of the Qurʾān penetrate those whose hearts are pure. Words and letters in their superficial forms may only penetrate the ṣadr, but their inner aspects may only be cognized by those who have opened their hearts to the reception of wisdom, for knowledge, in its true sense, is wisdom—a light that Allāh ﷻ places in the hearts of whomever He ﷻ wills. It is the heart that must be nurtured, opened, and cultivated so as to be able to receive the light of wisdom. witness the intricacies of the Texts (nuṣūṣ), and attain insight into higher realities, thus allowing man to embody the Prophetic words: “O Allāh ﷻ, show us things as they really are.”
And everything is His ﷻ to Command.
Chaudhury Nafee Ibne Sajed is a software engineer who has studied Computer Science at Stony Brook University. He is an avid reader and writer with a particular interest in the Islamic Tradition and its Sciences, ranging from fiqh, uṣūl, and ḥadīth to taṣawwuf, Philosophy, and Metahpysics. He may be found on Twitter here.
*Cover image:© Vyacheslav Argenberg / http://www.vascoplanet.com/, CC BY 4.0 <https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0>, via Wikimedia Commons
 Wael Hallaq, The Impossible State.
 Syed Naqīb al-Aṭṭās, Islām and Secularism, pg. 35.
 Karim Lahham, The Anatomy of Knowledge & the Ontological Necessity of First Principles.
 Al-Aṭṭās, Prolegomena, pg. 282.
 Mullā Jāmī, The Precious Pearl, pg. 39.
 Toshihiki Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism.
 Al-Aṭṭās, Prolegomena.
 Ibid, pp. 124-125.
 Toshihiko Izutsu, Sufism and Taoism, pg. 12.
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Garden of Truth, pg. 48.
 Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Qūnawī, Risālah al-Hādiyah; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Jāmī, The Precious Pearl, pg. 37.
 Hasan Spiker, Hierarchy & Freedom.
 Ibn ʿArabī, Fuṣūṣ al-Ḥikam.
 ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī, al-Wujūd.
 Al-Aṭṭās, Prolegomena, pg. 271.
 Ibid, pg. 269.
 Eric D. Perl, Thinking Being: Introduction to Metaphysics in the Classical Tradition.
 Al-Nābulusī, al-Wujūd.
 Sufism and Taoism, pg. 13.
 Titus Burckhardt, Introduction to Sufi Doctrine, pg. 13.
 Al-Aṭṭās, Prolegomena, pg. 279.
 Karim Lahham, The Anatomy of Knowledge & The Ontological Necessity of First Principles, pg. 74.
 As was understood by one position, as al-Jāmī writes that the view was disavowed by some of the later falāsifa and attributed to a lack of understanding,
 For a refutation of the view of the falāsifa from a non-Akbarian perspective, refer to al-Ghazālī’s Tahāfut al-Falāsifa.
 William Chittick, Rūmī and Waḥdat al-Wujūd, pp. 75-76.
 ʿAbd al-Wahhāb al-Shaʿrānī, al-Yawāqīt wa al-Jawāhir fī Bayān ʿAqāʾid al-Akābir, vol. 1 (Beirut: Dār al-Ṣādir, 2012), 99. Translation by Hasan Spiker in Nafs al-Amr, pg. 105.
 Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Bayān al-Farq bayna al-Ṣadr wa-l-Qalb wa-l-Fuʾād wa-l-Lubb.
 William Chittick, Ibn ʿArabī: Heir to the Prophets, pg. 32.
 Ibid, pg. 25.
 Ibid, pg. 50.
 Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn.
 Attributed to Imām Mālik. Abū Zahrah, The Fundamental Principles of Mālikī Fiqh.