The Arab Spring proved to be a crucial time in Middle East and North African history as the revolutions manifested from and resulted in an unprecedented level of public contention on the fitness and fate of autocratic and democratic governance and the role, whether merited or not, of Islam in the political realm of the Arab world. The chaos was due in part to the seismic shift from iron-clad, one-man authoritarian regimes of the late twentieth century and early twenty first century to the flimsy and potentially dangerous ‘transitional’ phases that ushered in a variety of regimes and governing bodies including Islamist rule, violent military coups, and for the outliers, bloody civil wars, as was the fate of Libya and Syria. Undeniably, Islam has long been and continues to be a key player as both a religious identity and an influencing ideology across the region. Moreover, Islamic thought, practice, and law were leveraged by several prominent authorities during the revolution, at times to support the revolutions and democratic regimes or to resist the revolution and instead support the prior autocratic regimes. Accordingly, a key group within this religio-political dynamic was that of the Ulama. It is precisely this class that Usaama Al-Azami studies in his Islam and the Revolutions: Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy which presents a thorough analysis of a handful of prominent influential Ulama figures in the region and their responses to the 2011 revolutions as rooted in their jurisprudential interpretations of phenomena such as rebellion, morality, democracy, and political obedience. The following review focuses on Usaama Al-Azami’s main methodology in studying the role of the Ulama and their heavy influence on the 2011 Arab Spring.
It is precisely this class that Usaama Al-Azami studies in his Islam and the Revolutions: Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy which presents a thorough analysis of a handful of prominent influential Ulama figures in the region and their responses to the 2011 revolutions as rooted in their jurisprudential interpretations of phenomena such as rebellion, morality, democracy, and political obedience.
Al-Azami presents a thorough analysis of Ulama figures such as Yusuf Al Qaradawi, Ahmad Al-Tayyib, Ali Gomaa, Hamza Yusuf, and Abdullah Bin Bayyah to name a few. He studies their positions through interviews and statements they expressed through public channels such as television, social media, and the like. Al-Azami closely examines these statements against the backdrop of sources such as the Qur’an and hadith and highlights how each of these ulama crafted their arguments to defend or deny the revolutions using the same pool of sources. On the one hand, ulama such as Yusuf Al Qaradawi strongly advocated for the revolutions and backed the protestors, citing Qur’anic verses and hadith that promote enjoining what is good and forbidding what is evil.[1] Al-Azami highlights the pro-revolutionary ulama discourse that leverages the concept of permissible and prohibited forms of rebellion in Islamic jurisprudence. On the other hand, Ali Gomaa and Ahmed Al-Tayyib, who held the titles of head Imam of Al-Azhar and the Grand Mufti of Egypt (officially non-partisan positions), promoted anti-revolution discourse that cite similar Qur’anic verses and hadith but heavily leverage this concept of fitna to argue that the revolutions were inherently un-Islamic as they were promoting chaos in society. The foundational concepts highlighted throughout both pro and anti-revolution discourses are morality, rebellion, fitna, obedience, and democracy. Al-Azami comments on these disparate conclusions by stating that it is as though the ulama on both sides are operating in two different realities.[2] Although Al-Azami remains objective in his overall analysis of these opposing discourses, he does suggest that the arguments provided by the pro-revolution scholars such as Yusuf Al-Qaradawi are far more persuasive in their engagement with the Islamic texts than the ulama on the anti-revolution side of the argument which alludes to a certain partisan bias on Al-Azami’s part.
Although not a political book in nature, Al-Azami’s analysis of the ulama is infused with political analysis. His treatment of Ahmad Al-Tayyib and Ali Gomma provide a good example of this.
Although not a political book in nature, Al-Azami’s analysis of the ulama is infused with political analysis. His treatment of Ahmad Al-Tayyib and Ali Gomma provide a good example of this. Both figures were anti-revolution and in the case of Ali Gomaa, presented violent argument against the protests in addition to being an alleged supporter of the Rabaa massacre of 2013. Al-Azami, studies the intellectual underpinnings of both Al-Tayyib and Gomaa and highlights their positions as head of Al-Azhar and Grand Mufti, respectively. Although both positions are not officially partisan in nature, realistically, both individuals were affiliated with Hosni Mubarak’s government, which complicates the soundness of their opinions on the 2011 revolutions. Although both scholars were rooting their overall arguments in Islamic jurisprudence by citing prominent Qur’anic verses and hadith to support their arguments, one can assume from reading Al-Azami’s portrayal that they had ulterior motives for making said claims. Gomma cited a few hadith on the religious necessity of obey one’s ruler – hadith that Al-Azami disclaims by stating that they were not authenticated using classical hadith standards.[3] Although some anti-revolution scholars such as the later mentioned Hamza Yusuf provide inconclusive commentary on the nature of this ruling regarding obeying rulers, stating that it may depend on whether the ruler is engaging in sinful acts which therefore justifies revolution, the overall anti-revolution rhetoric takes a direct violent tone during the 2013 Rabaa massacres arguing in favor of the military coup and justifying the death of several civilians as Gomaa argued.[4] Regardless of these nuanced interpretations of the overarching anti-revolution argument, these scholars’ political affiliations with Mubarak’s regime and their loyalty to the status quo, as Al-Azami argues, dilute from their anti-revolution arguments making such arguments more pro-autocracy in nature. Although Al-Azami refrains from explicit categorization of these ulamas into pro-democracy and pro-autocracy, the manner in which he dissects the ulamas’ arguments in support of or against the 2011 revolutions bears a polarizing tone on democracy.
The first scholar Al-Azami spotlights is Yusuf Al-Qaradawi who he argues is one of the most influential Islamic scholars of his kind in the region and carries significant influence especially via his main platform, his long running television series that aired on the Qatari based network Al Jazeera.[5] Al-Azami justifies his decision to primarily focus on Qaradawi given how the latter is revered in the region.[6] Al-Amazi’s analysis of Qaradawi’s pro-revolution arguments engage his interpretation of key Islamic notions of morality and justice as a prescribed duty of all Muslims. While Qaradawi’s views are shared with several individuals across the Middle East, his background and associations with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood are crucial to note in the overall discussion of his position as an Islamic scholar and the role he played in the 2011 revolutions. Qaradawi’s associations with Al-Azhar by education, the Muslim Brotherhood in ideology, and Al Jazeera as his primary platform linked to the Qatari monarchy, all complicate Qaradawi’s pro-revolution stance.
Al-Azami’s secondary title, “The Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy” alludes to the ulama’s roles in the political landscape of the region particularly during the time of the 2011 revolutions when several nations were aggressively shedding their previous authoritarian tones and transitioning to more democratic means of governance.
Al-Azami’s secondary title, “The Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy” alludes to the ulama’s roles in the political landscape of the region particularly during the time of the 2011 revolutions when several nations were aggressively shedding their previous authoritarian tones and transitioning to more democratic means of governance. Egypt in particular, as Al-Azami argues through his focus on Egyptian trajectory following the 2011 revolutions, offers a very nuanced state of transformation that took on multiple shapes over the course of the few years following the 2011 revolutions. The rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power in 2012 following the ousting of Hosni Mubarak’s authoritarian regime, as well as their short-lived power ending in a bloody massacre and military coup in 2013 highlights the need for examining the ulamas as an embodiment of Islamic law and thought and their ultimate role in shaping these events whether or not directly claimed.
Prior to delving into these ulamas’ roles in the politics following the aftermath of the 2011 revolutions as well as the relationship between Islamic scholars and the rise of Islam in politics particularly in Egypt in 2012, it is imperative to understand the discourse regarding the concept of rebellion in Islam as it was leveraged by scholars on both sides of the revolution argument as Islamic justification in support of or against the revolutions. In his book on the matter titled “Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law”, Khaled Abou El Fadhl engages the question of the role of Islamic jurists in society including the political system they reside within. Abou El Fadhl presents the following question, are Muslim jurists loyalists to any power that exists in their society or do they speak for Islamic law regardless? Throughout his analysis, Abou El Fadhl cites H. A. R. Gibb who argues that Muslim jurists went from extreme idealism to extreme realism.[7] In other words, he argues that Muslim jurists were instituting what they deemed right without compromises but subsequently became increasingly complacent and domicile in the sense that they took political reality into consideration when they formulated Islamic rulership justifying existing political authorities. These concepts are witnessed in Al-Azami’s engagement with ulama’s positions regarding the 2011 revolutions which were officially supported by Islamic texts and contexts but as Al-Azami alludes to, also undeniably engaged in political undertones and personal partisan affiliations as with the case of Ali Gomaa in particular.
The concept of rebellion as it relates to Islamic law was also leveraged throughout the discourse amongst these ulama in Al-Azami’s book both in support of and against the revolutions. According to Abou El Fadhl, whether or not certain rebellions can be considered permissible under Islamic law depends on the cause for rebellion. Abou El Fadhl contrasts rebellion against banditry as they both relate to Islamic principles claiming that both rebels and bandits perpetuate corruption by nature and this fitna argument was particularly used to support anti-revolution rhetoric amongst Islamic scholars like Ali Gomaa, Hamza Yusuf, and Ahmad Al-Tayyib. Overall, Abou El Fadhl views the dichotomy between permissible forms of rebellion and prohibited means of rebellion as portrayed by Islamic jurisprudence based on the concepts of baghy (rebellion) and hiraba (spreading corruption).[8] For Khaled Abou El Fadhl, the broader message is the idea that Islamic law is ever-changing because Islamic law by nature is an applied phenomenon whereas the sources i.e. scriptures do not change but we must separate the two to avoid determinantal repercussions of misinterpretation. Abou El Fadhl’s argument of the seemingly fluid nature of Islamic law is further supported in Al-Azami’s presentation of the ulamas’ arguments across the binary of what constitutes permissible rebellion in Islam and determining the point at which rebellions become inherently prohibited. Abou El Fadhl supports the notion of rebellion in Islam and argues that it is a form of opposition that existed in the Islamic history from the inception of the religion as a revolutionary enterprise by nature which preaches a doctrine of social justice and allows people the right to challenge inequality and injustice.[9] Pro-revolution scholars such as Qaradawi argue for similar results by also citing the duty of morality and justice amongst Muslims as stated in the Qur’an.[10] However, Abou El Fadhl also points out that rebellion has been treated by jurists as banditry particularly in the context of modern states in Muslim majority societies.[11] Opposition, he claims, is highly intolerable and, in most cases, highly cracked down upon claiming that banditry is against Islamic law and should therefore be severely punished but not however the opposition of legal of political disagreements as with the 2011 revolutions primarily targeted against authoritarian regimes.[12] Therefore, in countries where opposition was not tolerated and then severely punished for any kind of demonstration or criticism of government, like to a certain extent the Rabaa massacre of 2013, then those governments have no right on the base of Islamic law to punish protestors.
In his review of Al-Azami’s book, Nathan Brown argues that “Al-Azami is clear not only in his moral judgments on events but also on whose religious arguments he finds convincing and whose failing; whose factual accounts he accepts and whose he believes incorrect or misleading.”[13] However, Brown offers a counterargument for Al-Azami’s tone asserting that the revolutions undeniably invoked a sense of hope and possibility, and it is therefore difficult to remove those more hopeful perceptions from the overall reality of the tragic violent reactions on the part of these authoritarian regimes following the 2011 revolutions.[14] In a similar vein, Charles Kurzman introduces in The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran the idea of the anti-explanation where he argues it is difficult to determine how revolutions begin or thrive, however, examining revolutions retroactively inevitably incorporates a certain degree of biased perspectives which may be seen in Al-Azami’s analysis throughout his book.[15] Overall, Al-Azami’s book proves to be the first of its kind in the manner he incorporates the ulama’s statements and maps them out chronologically against the backdrop of prominent events across the 2011 Arab Spring timeline and beyond.
Although Al-Azami provides thorough examination of the multiple views surrounding the 2011 revolutions against the ultimate backdrop of Islamic jurisprudence, he is missing the “so-what” piece of his analysis.
Although Al-Azami provides thorough examination of the multiple views surrounding the 2011 revolutions against the ultimate backdrop of Islamic jurisprudence, he is missing the “so-what” piece of his analysis. Al-Azami highlights contradicting statements derived from the Quran and hadith on the part of a handful of ulama. Additionally, he notes it is as if the bickering ulama are operating in two separate realities by concluding very different and at times quite aggressive diametrically opposed views based on the same canonical texts and excerpts. However, Al-Azami needs to expand further on this groundwork study to examine the realm in which these prominent ulama stand, given their specific backgrounds regarding education as well as apparent political affiliations, whether or not confirmed overtly, influenced the rise of Islamism in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, particularly in cases such as Egypt. In his review of Al-Azami’s book Alan Mackie states that “The tragedy of the Arab Spring was that the Brotherhood’s compatibility with what Qaradawi called ‘Islamic democratic constitutionalism’ was never tested”.[16] The case of Egypt in particular could have been elaborated further within Al-Azami’s overall analysis incorporating factors such as Qaradawi’s Islamic democratic constitutionalism and its trajectory throughout the aftermath of the 2011 revolutions in Egypt. How have these ulamas’ views influenced the scope of Islam in politics and in relation to democracy in the aftermath of the 2011 Arab spring revolutions? How have these views particularly those of pro-revolutionary scholars such as Qaradawi supported prominent Islamist political parties built around the ideas of Islamic democracy such as the Muslim Brotherhood that rose to power in Egypt in 2012? Furthermore, how have these pro-revolutionary views as rooted in Islamic studies of the Qur’an, hadith, and Prophetic history during the 2011 revolutions pave the way for the subsequent rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in power as well as influence their ultimate decline as a result of a violent military coup in 2013? These are all potential avenues forward for Al-Azami’s foundational analysis of ulama discourse surrounding the revolutions in the Arab world as well as how these prominent views were leveraged in the aftermath of the 2011 revolutions.
Islam is often held by many Muslim thinkers as a timeless religion, applicable to all times and places, which only adds to the importance of exegesis and proper interpretation of religious texts. While there are several limitations to this claim that can be found within the religious tradition itself, starting to do so with that mindset and framework allows you to analyze the texts in an appropriately multi-dimensional manner. Religion, in the epistemological sense, is an established framework from which moral principles are derived, that help shape the boundaries of law and society and should not be discarded completely in the discussion surrounding the establishment of a governance in the Muslim world. Therefore, analyzing Islamic scholars’ views on the matter is critical, as Al-Azami asserts throughout his book, despite the multitude of somewhat contradictory conclusions derived from the same Islamic sources. Examining the Islamic backdrop to either authoritarian rule or democratic rule is imperative to the overall discussion around Islam and the Arab revolutions and Al-Azami’s work provides the space for that secondary level of intellectual discourse. The 2011 revolutions proved to be a time of change in the region, for better or for worse, and these events drastically altered the nature of governance, mainly characterized by the abandonment of autocratic allegiances in favor of a more democratic order, regardless of whether or not and to what extent that ambition was ever realized. That determination remains up to public speculation and future hindsight Islamic and political scholarly dissection of the play by play of the here and now.
Ousswa Ghannouchi is Associate Director of International Admissions at Mason and enjoys working with students from different parts of the world on their journey of seeking cultural exchange and a global education in the United States. Ousswa holds a Masters in Conflict Analysis and Resolution from George Mason University and is currently a student in GMU’s Middle East and Islamic Studies program. Her research interests are the politics and dynamics of authoritarian regimes, post-colonial development, and grassroots peacebuilding in intractable conflict settings, particularly in the Middle East and North Africa region.
[1] Al-Azami, U. (2021). Islam and the Arab revolutions: the ulama between democracy and autocracy. Hurst Publishers. 54.
[2] Ibid., 36.
[3] Ibid., 120.
[4] Ibid., 138.
[5] Ibid., 38.
[6] Ibid., 37.
[7] Abou El Fadl, K. (2001). Rebellion and violence in Islamic law. Cambridge University Press. 9.
[8] Ibid., 45-49
[9] Ibid., 28-131.
[10] Al-Azami, U. (2021). Islam and the Arab revolutions: the ulama between democracy and autocracy. Hurst Publishers. 96.
[11] Abou El Fadl, K. (2001). Rebellion and violence in Islamic law. Cambridge University Press. 157.
[12] Ibid., 158-161.
[13] Brown, Nathan J. “Islam and the Arab Revolutions: The Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy by Usaama Al- Azami.” Journal of Islamic studies (Oxford, England) (2022): n. pag. Web.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Kurzman, Charles. The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005.
[16] Alan Mackie (2022) Islam and the Arab Revolutions: The Ulama Between Democracy and Autocracy, Asian Affairs, 53:3, 783-785